Southeast Asia is Inching Towards BRICS

In January 2025, Indonesia made its move and stepped into BRICS, the club of heavyweight emerging economies led by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Not long after, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam came aboard as partner countries. Now Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos are hovering near the door, trying to decide if they want to follow. If they all go for it, seven of ASEAN’s ten members will have ties to BRICS — a big shift for a region that’s spent decades insisting it wouldn’t pick a side in the tug-of-war between Washington and Beijing.

For years, Southeast Asia perfected the art of hedging — taking what it liked from both giants but never locking itself into anyone’s corner. It kept the region flexible, calm, and hard to pressure. But that middle lane is shrinking. Trump is back in the White House, firing off tariffs and treating diplomacy like a balance sheet, while China keeps turning up the heat in the South China Sea and eyeing Taiwan with less patience. Between a prickly United States and a bold China, the region needed new breathing room.

BRICS stepped right into the opening.

St. Petersburg, Guangxi, and Manila: The New Power Circuits

On June 19, 2025, under the chandeliers of St. Petersburg’s Constantine Palace, Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto shook hands with Vladimir Putin and thanked him for backing Indonesia’s BRICS membership. Jakarta didn’t just show up — it doubled down, announcing a strategic partnership with Moscow worth billions. And the unspoken headline was even louder: Prabowo skipped the G7 to be there. That’s Indonesia taking its “independent and active” policy and giving it a sharper, louder edge.

A month later, Vietnam made its own statement. For the first time ever, Vietnamese troops headed to China’s Guangxi Province for joint army exercises with the PLA. Ten days later, both sides were calling themselves future partners and “comrades and brothers.” For two countries with a long war history, current maritime disputes, and simultaneous ties to Washington, this was a jaw-dropping moment.

And then came Manila. On August 2, 2025, while President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. flew to India, the Philippine and Indian navies were running their first joint drills in the South China Sea. Days later, Marcos and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi rolled out a strategic partnership focused on submarines, defense production, and missile systems — including the BrahMos missiles. That same week, Marcos said the Philippines was open to exploring BRICS membership. Manila rarely drops hints like that.

BRICS isn’t outside the region’s window anymore — it’s sitting in the living room.

Hedging: The Region’s Signature Survival Instinct

To understand what’s going on, you’ve got to look backward. Hedging didn’t appear overnight. It was the region’s survival strategy long before BRICS even existed.

After World War II, Southeast Asian states were newly independent and already caught between Beijing’s support for insurgencies and Washington’s push for alliances. China armed North Vietnam with hundreds of thousands of weapons, while the U.S. signed defense pacts and turned Thai airfields into hubs for bombing runs. Both sides wanted influence. None of the region’s leaders wanted to become someone’s client again.

Sovereignty was their non-negotiable line. From the Bandung Conference to the founding of ASEAN, everything was built on not being dragged into someone else’s rivalry. Hedging became the only strategy that preserved autonomy.

Every country hedged in its own flavor. Vietnam took a long-term, sovereignty-first approach — deepening ties with Washington while sticking to its “three nos.” Thailand swung between Beijing and the West depending on who was governing. Cambodia and Laos became more tightly bound to China as their political choices narrowed. Myanmar leaned on China and Russia for weapons and diplomatic protection after the coup. Geography, economics, and domestic stability shaped the rest.

Eventually, the region split into three lanes: the US-leaners like Singapore and the Philippines; the China-dependent states like Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia; and the middle group — Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam — who mix partners to maximize leverage. That middle lane is exactly where BRICS found its opening.

The Squeeze: Why Hedging Is Getting Harder

This moment feels different because both giants are applying new kinds of pressure.

Trump’s tariffs spooked export-dependent economies. Vietnam nearly got slammed with a 46% headline rate before scrambling into provisional terms. Companies can live with high tariffs; they can’t survive unpredictable ones. Meanwhile, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework still offers no real market access.

China, on the other hand, has grown bolder on the water. The 2016 tribunal ruling didn’t slow Beijing down. The coastguard keeps harassing Philippine vessels near Second Thomas Shoal, and every new “standard map” sparks outrage across the region. Economically, China’s importance is undeniable — ASEAN–China trade hit $900 billion in 2023. That gives Beijing leverage, and everyone knows it.

So the region is being pushed from both sides. Hedging is still the plan, but it’s getting harder to pull off. Countries need new room to maneuver.

BRICS gives them that room.

What BRICS Brings to the Table

BRICS+ has grown into a 20-country constellation that represents 45% of the world’s population and a huge slice of the global economy. It isn’t exactly a united team, but it offers something Southeast Asia cares about: options.

Singapore doesn’t need it. The Philippines has to tread carefully. But the middle group — Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam — sees real value.

BRICS expands their reach. India is hungry for edible oils, which keeps Indonesian and Malaysian producers steady. The UAE’s trade corridors open doors across Asia, Africa, and Europe. Vietnam and Brazil are building deeper two-way trade in food and manufacturing. Indonesia is eyeing tariff reductions with the Eurasian Economic Union. And the BRICS New Development Bank offers long-term loans in local currencies — a lifeline for countries trying to avoid dollar swings during unstable times.

For BRICS, Southeast Asia is too valuable to ignore. It sits on the world’s busiest sea lanes, holds critical minerals, and connects vital supply chains. Bringing ASEAN states closer strengthens BRICS’ reach, voice, and influence.

What Happens Next

This isn’t the moment the region flips sides. This is Southeast Asia doing what it has always done — staying flexible enough to survive whatever the great powers throw at it.

BRICS won’t replace the U.S. or China. It’s simply the newest tool in the region’s hedging kit. Countries can take loans from BRICS, run military exercises with Washington, trade with China, and keep all three at arm’s length.

For BRICS to become more than that, it would have to evolve — adopt clear rules, embrace non-interference, and act more like ASEAN. But BRICS isn’t that kind of organization. China and Russia want a harder line. India and Brazil don’t. Members cooperate when it’s convenient and look the other way when it’s not.

No one expects a NATO-style bloc.

Southeast Asia isn’t making a dramatic turn. It’s making a smart one. It’s reading the room, watching the giants, and adjusting its footing — the same way it has for decades. Only now, the world around it is louder, messier, and hungrier than before.