The Forgotten Frontline: Why India’s Nuclear Security Failure Is a Global Blind Spot
In the global imagination, nuclear threats typically stem from rogue regimes or unstable dictatorships.

## The Risk the World Ignores
In the global imagination, nuclear threats typically stem from rogue regimes or unstable dictatorships. But this binary overlooks a far more subtle — and equally dangerous — vulnerability: nuclear negligence in democracies shielded by strategic partnerships.
India, widely regarded as a responsible nuclear state, has benefited from this diplomatic blind spot. It is a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and yet enjoys the trust of global powers. But behind that trust lies a history of radioactive thefts, smuggling incidents, and doctrinal ambiguity that should place India not in a protected circle — but under a microscope.
## India's Security Record: The Hard Evidence
Between 1994 and 2021, India reported at least **18 instances of nuclear or radioactive material theft or loss** — incidents involving highly dangerous substances, many of which were never recovered:
* **1995:** Uranium theft at Rajasthan Atomic Power Station
* **2008:** Disappearance of radioactive isotopes from labs across multiple states
* **2021:** Seizure of 7.1 kg of uranium in Maharashtra, valued at over \$2.8 million
[https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-07/news-briefs/india-arrests-alleged-uranium-traders](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-07/news-briefs/india-arrests-alleged-uranium-traders)
These are not isolated lapses. They represent systemic flaws in inventory control, regulatory enforcement, and physical security — issues that, in any other nuclear-armed country, would prompt global alarm.
## Recent Breaches: 2023 and Beyond
Two high-profile incidents in 2023 further highlighted these risks:
* **Bihar:** Police apprehended three individuals attempting to smuggle **50 grams of Californium**, a radioactive material worth ₹8.5 billion.
[https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/bihar-police-seize-rare-rs-850-crore-radioactive-material-three-arrested-6300460](https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/bihar-police-seize-rare-rs-850-crore-radioactive-material-three-arrested-6300460)
* **Dehradun:** Authorities intercepted five individuals in possession of a **stolen radioactive device** originating from the **Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC)**.
[https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2024/Jul/12/five-arrested-in-dehradun-with-stolen-radioactive-device-terror-angle-probed](https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2024/Jul/12/five-arrested-in-dehradun-with-stolen-radioactive-device-terror-angle-probed)
Both cases demonstrated not only ease of access to sensitive material, but also the **absence of effective national containment**.
## Doctrinal Ambiguity: Strategic Confusion in a Nuclear Flashpoint
Bharat Karnad, one of India’s foremost nuclear strategists, has publicly warned that Indian leadership often **misinterprets key doctrinal terms** — especially the distinction between a “credible minimum deterrent” and a “minimum credible deterrent.”
[https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-nuclear-doctrine-debate-pub-63950](https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-nuclear-doctrine-debate-pub-63950)
Such misalignment, especially in South Asia’s high-alert environment, increases the risk of **accidental escalation or unauthorized launch decisions**, which should raise concerns beyond India’s borders.
## Comparison with International Norms
Despite operating a substantial nuclear arsenal, India remains **outside the NPT framework** and **partially compliant** with the IAEA safeguards. According to the 2008 U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Deal:
* India agreed to separate its civilian and military facilities
* Only selected reactors were placed under **IAEA supervision**
* **No binding enforcement mechanism** was created to ensure long-term compliance
[https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm](https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm)
In contrast, nations like Iran and North Korea are subjected to intense scrutiny, sanctions, and global oversight mechanisms — despite having fewer known lapses than India.
## The Regulator Problem: AERB’s Lack of Independence
India’s **Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)** remains under the administrative control of the Department of Atomic Energy — the very body it is meant to oversee. This creates a conflict of interest and weakens institutional accountability.
The **absence of a national registry for radioactive materials**, along with minimal public disclosure of safety violations, contributes to a high-risk, low-transparency environment.
## Civilian Fallout: The Mayapuri and Madras Incidents
Radiological risks are not confined to policy circles. Civilians have paid the price:
* **Mayapuri, Delhi (2010):** A Cobalt-60 irradiator from Delhi University ended up in a scrapyard, killing one man and injuring several.
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mayapuri](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mayapuri)
* **Madras (2002):** A radioactive fluid leak at the Madras Atomic Power Station exposed plant workers and raised alarms over aging infrastructure and poor maintenance.
[https://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1011/p07s01-wosc.html](https://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1011/p07s01-wosc.html)
In both cases, the danger came not from hostile states — but from institutional decay.
## Diplomatic Blind Spots and Strategic Partnerships
India’s global image as a counterweight to China — and its status as a major economic market — has led to a **diplomatic tolerance for subpar nuclear governance**. Strategic interests have consistently overshadowed security imperatives.
This has resulted in:
* Lack of multilateral pressure for compliance
* Minimal international media coverage of incidents
* Delayed reform of domestic safeguards
The world’s silence, in this context, is complicity.
## Global Recommendations
The international community, in coordination with India, must urgently act to reduce systemic risks:
1. **Push for full IAEA access to all civilian nuclear facilities**
2. **Encourage India to formalize its doctrine under global strategic stability frameworks**
3. **Support the creation of an independent regulatory body with legislative protection**
4. **Require detailed, real-time reporting of radioactive incidents to international bodies**
5. **Reassess the assumptions underlying the U.S.-India nuclear partnership**
## Conclusion: A Call for Equal Scrutiny
India’s nuclear ambitions are no longer speculative. Its arsenal, facilities, and doctrines are now central to South Asian — and global — security. But the assumptions underpinning India’s “responsibility” are eroding under evidence.
Security is not determined by rhetoric, alliances, or market size. It is determined by **consistency, transparency, and accountability**. The international community must begin treating India not as an exception — but as an equal.
Nuclear oversight should be universal, not selective.
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**References**
1. Arms Control Association (2021) — [https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-07/news-briefs/india-arrests-alleged-uranium-traders](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-07/news-briefs/india-arrests-alleged-uranium-traders)
2. NDTV (2023) — [https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/bihar-police-seize-rare-rs-850-crore-radioactive-material-three-arrested-6300460](https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/bihar-police-seize-rare-rs-850-crore-radioactive-material-three-arrested-6300460)
3. The New Indian Express (2024) — [https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2024/Jul/12/five-arrested-in-dehradun-with-stolen-radioactive-device-terror-angle-probed](https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2024/Jul/12/five-arrested-in-dehradun-with-stolen-radioactive-device-terror-angle-probed)
4. Wikipedia (2010) — [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mayapuri](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mayapuri)
5. Christian Science Monitor (2002) — [https://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1011/p07s01-wosc.html](https://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1011/p07s01-wosc.html)
6. U.S. Department of State — [https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm](https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm)
7. Carnegie Endowment (2016) — [https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-nuclear-doctrine-debate-pub-63950](https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-nuclear-doctrine-debate-pub-63950)



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