Russia has lost 2000 tanks in Ukraine 🇺🇦
As of the making of this video, Russia has lost just under 2000 tanks in Ukraine. Of these losses, over 50% have been from one type of tank alone: the T-72. But while the T-72 has been one of the most commonly used tanks worldwide, even today, the war in Ukraine has highlighted some massive problems. These problems are so glaring they might make other countries still using the tank transfer them from active service to somewhere more fitting like a museum or the scrap heap. Before getting into the host of problems Russia has had with its T-72s, it’s crucial to understand why the tank came about to explain the litany of issues it faces today. During the Cold War, the USSR knew that it would have numerical superiority over the West in any major conflict. With that in mind, Soviet leadership decided to prioritize cheaply produced large quantities of tanks over crew survivability. And the results of this decision are clearly shown in its design flaws. Weighing in at roughly 20 tons less than comparable Western Main Battle Tanks of the time, the T-72 accomplishes this impressive feat because it eliminated one of the crew positions. Traditional tanks have always relied upon a four-person crew which comprised of a commander, driver, loader, and gunner. The Soviets eliminated the loader position by creating the world's first-ever autoloader in the T-64. By removing the loader, the tank could be much smaller and, therefore, weigh less. However, the T-64 had numerous issues of its own that the Soviets wanted to fix, like its underpowered engine and poor night fighting capabilities. The T-64 was also very expensive to produce, and the Soviets wanted to basically build a newer, cheaper model of it. Because of this, the Soviets wanted to cut down on the weight, which would not only cut down on fuel costs but also other tactical advantages. For example, Soviet strategists purposely had bridges built that could withstand the weight of T-72 tanks but would crumble under the weight of heavier Western tanks. However, this lack of weight has proven to be one of the T-72's main downfalls: because this compromise meant a fatal lack of armor protection. The original armor protection for the first-generation T-72s was simply steel plates, like in World War Two. These first-generation T-72s, known as the Urals, were quickly upgraded in later variations, such as the T-72A and T-72B. Each subsequent upgrade has strengthened the tank by adding laminate armor into the tank's design. Similar to how Western tanks use composite armor to give flexibility and strength to tank hulls, the Soviet and later Russian governments have done the same thing. However, even these upgrades never made much of a difference. During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, T-72 tanks suffered huge losses from even Israeli 105mm tank guns mounted on their vehicles. Many of these losses resulted from penetrating shots through the glacis or frontal armor plate, the strongest part of the T-72's armor. However, during this same conflict, Syria captured the Israeli Explosive Reactive Armor, or ERA, and sent these samples to the Soviet Union for study and testing. Soviet engineers used Israeli technology to accelerate their own ERA program. During subsequent upgrades, such as the T-72B3 series that started in the late 80s and has continued since each new generation of T-72 has gotten increasingly sophisticated ERA. However, this has been a problem for the T-72 in several ways. Firstly is the weight. Each new iteration of ERA adds several tons of weight to the tank, slowing down an already underpowered vehicle. Secondly is that ERA has proven time and again to be effective only against older kinetic penetrators and anti-tank missiles. ERA does little to nothing to stop damage inflicted by modern Western anti-tank systems, ammunition, and artillery. Russia has tried to improve the armor of the T-72 by installing the latest and greatest armor systems on modern battlefields. Known as Active Protection Systems, or APS, these are the latest systems designed for tank survivability. APS works through a series of radars that detect incoming kinetic and missile threats. Once tracked, onboard missiles then leave the tank and destroy the threat before it ever touches the tank. While the Afganit is the newest APS system employed by Russia on its T-14 tanks, the Arena system is its first-generation system utilized by the bulk of its armored force, including T-72B3 tanks that started getting refurbished from 2016 onwards. Despite sounding good on paper, it’s clear even this most advanced system has yet to do much to improve tank survivability. Between 2017 and 2020, 558 T-72B3s were delivered to the Russian army. The data as of this video's creation shows that 530 of these upgraded vehicles have been knocked out. Taking into account the T-72s Russia could have upgraded between 2020 and 2023 shows that probably around 90% of its upgraded T-72B3s have been destroyed, damaged, or captured in Ukraine. These staggering figures have huge implications beyond just the loss of life and represent a major regression in available tank technology for Russian tank units. The upgrades for the T-72B3 program were supposed to make the T-72 viable on a modern battlefield. As just mentioned, among these factors was adding improved ERA and Arena APS systems. However, other factors like improving the gun stabilizers, installing digital radios, advanced optics, and new fire control computers made these T-72s the most advanced T-72 variant on the battlefield. But even these were cut down easily by Ukraine, leaving Russia to rely on older T-72A and B models with woefully outdated equipment for a modern battlefield. Among the outdated equipment are its gun and stabilizers. The T-72's main gun comes in at an impressive 125mm. While this might seem great on paper, it has not been so fearsome in practice. Despite having a larger caliber gun than most Western tanks, including the M1 Abrams, numerous factors limit the T-72's lethality. One of these factors is its limited elevation. The elevation of a gun is how far up and down the gun can traverse. The T-72 has a range of negative five degrees to positive fourteen degrees. By comparison, Western tanks have about ten more degrees of elevation. This limited elevation means that the T-72 cannot hit as wide a range of targets both in distance and from vertical positions. Such a shortfall dictates to the tank commander when and where he can engage targets. But another factor constrains the range of targets a commander can hit. Compared to Western tanks, the T-72’s main gun can only withstand about half the pressure before it fails. This is a huge deal since it means that even though Western tanks fire slightly smaller caliber shells, these shells can have much more propellant behind them. With hotter, more powerful propellants moving the projectiles, Western tanks can fire slightly smaller rounds further and faster than the T-72. From a tactical perspective, this means Western tanks could shoot a T-72 before it could get a shot off at them. But Western tanks can not only hit them first; they can also see them first. The T-72 has enormous problems with its optics. Compared to Western tanks, the visibility is much more limited than Western tanks. This is because the crew has only a few small ports to see out of, and the commander does not have an all-around camera view like later model T-72s, most of which have been destroyed in Ukraine. But further decreasing this already limited view is the tank's almost complete blindness at night and poor weather conditions. Although many of the T-72B3s got the more modern Sosna-U gunsights that offered high-quality night vision and thermal sights, these are rare on the battlefield now. Not only have most T-72s equipped with them already been knocked out, but the crushing sanctions have limited the production of this vital equipment. Specifically for the Sosna-U sights, a French company made most of the crucial components that Russia then assembled domestically. With this supply now cut off, Russia has claimed to have produced similar gun sights. Still, these limited production runs have made a lackluster product, with most Western analysts suggesting the effective visual range of the T-72 has been cut in half even with the new sights. Another issue plaguing the T-72s that remain in service is its fire control system. Older models of the T-72 have outdated stabilizers on the gun that operate independently in the x and y axes. Because of this, shooting on the move is inaccurate at best for most crews, and the tank must come to a stop, fire, and then displace. Of course, this kind of technical failure has huge tactical implications since it means now that Russian tanks cannot shoot and move effectively. This makes them huge targets for infantry with anti-tank weapons and more vulnerable to artillery and rocket fire. Combined with the fact that Russia has been starting to use older tanks like the T-72 and T-64 as mobile artillery platforms as its own guns are past their service life or destroyed means that the T-72 will continue to be unnecessarily exposed. However, outdated gun stabilizers are not the only things that leave the tank exposed. It is also the obsolete fire control computers. Unlike Western or even more modern Russian tanks, the legacy T-72s have analog fire control computers. Because they are so old, the gunner has to manually input data into them before firing each shot. The only input that goes in automatically is the tank's speed. All other information like range, temperature, barrel life, cross-wind, and other data is input digit by digit each time during each engagement. Because the gunner has to frantically type away because his life literally depends on it is a massive flaw in the older T-72s that remains since newer tanks automatically input most of this data to make for faster engagements. But despite all these flaws, arguably the most fatal flaw that has directly led to the destruction of T-72s is its ammunition stowage. Because the T-72 relies on an autoloader, half of the ammunition and charges are stored in a rotating cupola along the tank's floor. Because of the weak armor, as previously discussed, any shot penetrating the turret will likely set off one or more of these charges or rounds. This will then create a catastrophic explosion known as the jack-in-the-box effect that blows that turret off the tank and kills the crew. But while this scenario is the most commonly cited reason why the tank is flawed, it’s actually worse than that. Poor ammunition stowage is present throughout the tank and not just in the unprotected autoloader. This is because the T-72, as a tank class, has no dedicated ammunition stowage spaces. Unlike Western tanks that prioritize crew survivability by incorporating blast doors, vents, and advanced fire suppression systems in the event of exploding ammunition, T-72s have no such features. In fact, with such limited space inside the fighting compartment, it’s almost comical where the Soviets decided to store their shells and charges. For example, both the commander and the gunner have two projectiles and a charge stored behind them, and the gunner has three shells on a rack directly behind his seat. Other great spots the Russians have decided to stow reserve ammunition have been on top of the fuel tanks and any random nook and cranny they can find. The end result of this has been horrible. As noted by American tankers during both the Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, any penetration of the T-72's hull can lead to a catastrophic kill. This is because the likelihood of setting off ammunition in the tank is high no matter where it is hit. As a result, the T-72, especially the older ones Russia has left in Ukraine, are among the most outdated and least survivable tanks on the battlefield, no matter the situation. Want to know more about how things are going for Russia in Ukraine? Check out “How Putin Actually Thought the War in Ukraine Would End” or watch “World War 3 - Most Likely Things That Will Cause It” for a look at some worst-case scenarios!
