Healthy Self-Esteem vs. Pathological Narcissism: Drawing the Line

Abstract: The notion of narcissism, originating from the myth of Narcissus — where a handsome teenager becomes enamored with his own reflection — was systematically addressed for the first time in Sigmund Freud’s 1914 essay “On Narcissism”. This article commences with a succinct overview of Freud’s perspective on narcissism, which serves as the foundation for most later discourse on the subject, before addressing key philosophical inquiries that have persistently emerged regarding narcissism and self-love. How do we distinguish between healthy self-esteem and pathological narcissism? Considering the seemingly omnipresent nature of “the dear self” (as Kant termed it) in human awareness, what would it need to foster a really non-narcissistic regard for others, and is this feasible — or even advantageous?

The concept of narcissism, originating from the myth of Narcissus — where a handsome youth becomes enamored with his own reflection — first emerged in the late nineteenth century through the works of British sexologist Havelock Ellis and German psychiatrist Paul Näcke, before receiving its initial systematic analysis in Sigmund Freud’s 1914 essay “On Narcissism” (see FREUD, SIGMUND). In the late twentieth century, the notion was further refined by psychoanalysts Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg, and popularized by Christopher Lasch’s 1979 blockbuster, The Culture of Narcissism. Narcissistic personality disorder was characterized in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as “a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy” (2000: 714) and was preserved (with slightly altered diagnostic criteria) in the fifth edition.

The notion of narcissism has been used in several diverse contexts throughout history. Originally conceived by Freud as a technical word in psychoanalytic theory, “narcissism” has been used more generally to signify an excessive level of self-love. This discrepancy in use introduces the potential for considerable misunderstanding, since for Freud and several other psychoanalysts, narcissism is not inherently a detrimental condition. In psychoanalytic literature, “pathological” or “malignant” narcissism is often juxtaposed with the “healthy” narcissism present in all typical human individuals. This distinction is not often recognized in the more prevalent use of the word, where “narcissism” is seen as an inherently excessive kind of self-love.

In philosophy, the word “narcissism” has mostly been used by authors inspired by the Freudian paradigm. Narcissism is a significant idea in the theories of Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida, and has been integrated into modern feminist philosophy via the contributions of Luce Irigaray and others. In modern analytical philosophy, the word “narcissism” is hardly used; but, the notion of self-love has garnered heightened scrutiny, particularly in the writings of Simon Blackburn, Harry Frankfurt, and Iris Murdoch (see to MURDOCH, IRIS). Participants in these discussions have used Freud and his subsequent tradition as a significant source of understanding, while also seeking inspiration from the extensive pre-Freudian philosophical discourse on self-love. Prior to Ovid’s conclusive rendition of the Narcissus tale, Aristotle in Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics questioned “whether an individual should prioritize self-love or love for others” (2000: 1168a) (see ARISTOTLE; LOVE). The issue of self-love and its extremes is pivotal in the writings of St. Augustine and serves as a fundamental concept for Rousseau, Kant, and several other influential thinkers (see to AUGUSTINE, SAINT; ROUSSEAU; KANT). While the name “narcissism” is absent in the discourse of these pre-Freudian authors, the philosophical inquiries on self-love are intricately connected to post-Freudian studies over the essence of narcissism. This article will avoid offering a singular definition of narcissism and self-love, given the extensive diversity of interpretations surrounding these concepts. Instead, it aims to present a comprehensive overview of the fundamental philosophical issues inherent in both pre- and post-Freudian theories.

This article will commence with a concise overview of Freud’s perspective on narcissism, as it serves as the foundation for most subsequent discourse on the subject, before addressing key questions that have persistently emerged in philosophical examinations of narcissism and self-love. How do we delineate the boundary between healthy self-esteem and malignant narcissism (refer to SELF-RESPECT AND SELF-ESTEEM)? Considering the seemingly omnipresent nature of “the dear self” (as Kant describes it) in human awareness, what would it need to foster a really non-narcissistic regard for others, and is this feasible — or even advantageous?

Freud and the Psychoanalytic Tradition

Freud’s first exploration of narcissism appears in his 1910 essay on Leonardo da Vinci, and thereafter, the subject persists as a focal focus in his oeuvre, notably in the 1914 essay “On Narcissism.” Central to Freud’s theory of narcissism is his differentiation between “primary” and “secondary” narcissism. Freud conceptualizes primary narcissism as a natural developmental phase encountered by all typical human beings. It is “an original libidinal cathexis of the ego” (1914/1957: 75); in other words, a process whereby the developing sexual urges target the ego as their goal. In primary narcissism, the individual “acts as if he were enamored with himself” (1913/1953: 89). In young infants, this kind of narcissism is characterized by grandiosity — “an overestimation of the power of their wishes and mental acts” (1914/1957: 75) — and egoism (see EGOISM). The kid perceives himself (and, as Freud observes, is often seen by his parents) as “the centre and core of creation — ‘His Majesty the Baby’” (1914/1957: 91).

Freud considers basic narcissism a normal and entirely healthy developmental phase that is progressively transcended when the kid has the ability to focus his desire towards external things. Freud observes that an individual retains a degree of narcissism even after discovering external objects for their desire (1913/1953: 89). This phenomenon arises via what Freud refers to as “narcissistic object-choice” (1914/1957: 88). In some instances, individuals whose libido seems directed towards other entities are, in reality, “clearly seeking themselves as a love-object” (1914/1957: 88). Freud’s prominent illustrations of this phenomenon include “perverts and homosexuals” (1914/1957: 88), yet he similarly perceives parents’ “overvaluation” of their children: “The child shall fulfill those wishful dreams of the parents which they never realized — the boy shall become a great man and a hero in his father’s stead, and the girl shall marry a prince as a belated compensation for her mother” (1914/1957: 91). Parental love, often considered the most genuine and altruistic kind of affection, ultimately reveals itself as “nothing but the parents’ narcissism reborn” (1914/1957: 91).

In addition to narcissistic object-choice, another primary manifestation of narcissism in adulthood is referred to as “secondary narcissism.” In basic narcissism, the individual has not completely cultivated the ability to channel desire towards external things; conversely, in secondary narcissism, libido is “withdrawn from the external world” and “redirected to the ego” (1914/1957: 75). Secondary narcissism is characterized by a psychological detachment from others, an intensified emotional focus on oneself demonstrated through increased introspection and self-centered behavior, and a regression to childlike modes of thought and behavior, particularly the excessive valuation of one’s needs, qualities (such as power or brilliance), and achievements (Wallwork 1991: 152). This kind of narcissism perhaps aligns most closely with the modern interpretation of the word. It is important to emphasize that, according to Freud, secondary narcissism is not inherently abnormal. A periodic withdrawal from the external environment may serve as a fundamental protective mechanism that enhances psychological well-being. Freud associates it with the necessity of sleep and likens it to an amoeba retracting its extensions for self-preservation (1917/1963: 417). He even contemplates, “what compels our mental existence to transcend the confines of narcissism and to direct the libido towards external objects” (1914/1957: 85). His response indicates that although “a robust egoism serves as a safeguard against illness, […] ultimately, we must cultivate love to avoid falling ill, and we are destined to become ill if, due to frustration, we are incapable of loving” (1914/1957:85).

Since Freud, psychoanalysts have persistently evolved, refined, and critiqued his theory of narcissism. A significant theme in these talks is the notion that narcissism may function as a defensive mechanism stemming from both a deficiency in self-love or self-esteem and an excess of it (Kernberg 1970). While psychoanalysts have largely concurred on the necessity of differentiating between healthy and pathological (or “malignant”) narcissism (Fromm 1964), two prominent figures in 20th-century psychoanalysis — Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg — notoriously diverged on whether the analyst’s role should be to empathize with or confront the patient’s (pathological) narcissism to facilitate her transcendence of it (Lunbeck 2014).

Narcissism, Self-Esteem, and Self-Love in Philosophical Discourse

If we adopt Freud’s perspective and that of the succeeding psychoanalytical tradition, which posits that not all manifestations of narcissism are inherently disordered, how can we differentiate between beneficial and detrimental kinds of self-love? Philosophers addressing this subject may be broadly categorized into two groups. Some assert that the appropriate kind of self-love is focused on the correct aspect of the self. In Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle recognizes that individuals disparage those who exhibit self-affection, labeling them as ‘self-lovers’ (2000: 1168a). The prevailing perspective posits that self-love and love for others are incompatible. The virtuous individual “acts for the benefit of his friend, disregarding his own interests” (2000: 1168a). Aristotle unequivocally considers this prevalent perspective to be erroneous. While it is accurate that a certain kind of self-love impedes our ability to behave virtuously, only those who “allocate to themselves the greater portion of wealth, accolades, and physical indulgences” are rightly classified as self-lovers in this context (2000: 1168b). Another kind of self-lover, however, “attributes to himself the noblest and best qualities and satisfies the most authoritative aspect of his being” — in other words, his reason (1168b) (see RATIONALITY; REASON AND PASSION). This kind of self-lover “will assist himself and others through noble actions” (2000: 1169a). As he is solely committed to noble pursuits, he would willingly forfeit his wealth or even lose his life for his companions if virtue necessitates it (2000: 1169a). According to Aristotle, since this is the essence of self-love, then it follows that we all “ought to be self-lovers” (2000: 1169b).

According to Aristotle, the appropriate kind of self-love is not only compatible with a virtuous life but is also essential and fundamental to it. While he did not address the concept of self-love explicitly, Plato has been seen as holding a comparable perspective. Philosopher and psychologist Jonathan Lear has said that, according to Plato, the objective of the just individual may be characterized as “the narcissistic contentment of intrapsychic harmony” (Lear 1993: 137). For both Plato and Aristotle, the examination of one’s own soul’s interior structure — essentially, the cultivation of appropriate narcissism — is the paramount preoccupation of the just individual.

In current analytical philosophy, Harry Frankfurt is the foremost advocate of self-love as an essential element of the ideal life. For Frankfurt, authentic self-love is a substantial accomplishment requiring unwavering dedication to one’s passions. Despite differing specifics, Frankfurt concurs with Aristotle over the fundamental significance of self-love for a fulfilling existence. According to Frankfurt, the volitional oneness attained via self-love is a requisite for loving anything else (Frankfurt 2006).

Historically, the primary rival to the Aristotelian perspective on self-love comes from the Christian tradition. According to St. Augustine, self-love is the fundamental issue of sin. He asserts, “The fundamental ruin of humanity was self-love” (O’Donovan 1980: 96). Augustine, like most of the Christian tradition, grapples with the Biblical mandate to love one’s neighbor as oneself, which suggests the need of a sort of self-love that is not only permissible but perhaps essential for salvation. Augustine’s resolution to this issue markedly contrasts with Aristotle’s. Instead of differentiating the positive and negative aspects of self-love based on the specific aspect of the self they address, Augustine differentiates them based on the self’s relationship to an external object. Deity. “May I instruct you on the manner in which to love yourself?”“He inquires.” Your self-love consists of loving God with your whole being.(O’Donovan 1980: 39). Augustine is fundamentally reversing Aristotle’s perspective. Augustine maintains that love for an external entity, namely God, is the fundamental requirement for establishing a proper relationship with oneself, rather than self-love being the necessary condition for loving others.

Philosophers from both the continental and analytical traditions have proposed many interpretations of the Augustinian stance. Emmanuel Levinas posits that a significant portion of Western philosophy is characterized by what he terms “narcissism, or the primacy of the same” (Levinas 1987: 49). To transcend this intrinsic narcissism, Levinas contends that we must be receptive to the “epiphany” of a “absolutely exterior being” — namely, the Other (Levinas 1987: 54). Similar to Augustine, Levinas argues that we cannot have an appropriate relationship with ourselves unless we liberate ourselves from narcissism and focus our attention on that which is really external to the self. Iris Murdoch posits that the primary adversary in moral existence is the “fat relentless ego” (Murdoch 2001b: 51), contending that this adversary can only be vanquished via love — “the exceedingly challenging acknowledgment that something beyond oneself is real” (Murdoch 1998: 215). According to Murdoch, a profound attentiveness to the reality of others is the only means by which one might transcend the illusions and fancies constructed by the ego. Murdoch expresses skepticism on the concept of healthy narcissism, contending that the “self is such a dazzling object that if one looks there one may see nothing else” (Murdoch 2001a: 30).

Beyond the “Dear Self”?

Murdoch’s apprehension over the misleading essence of self-love aligns with a crucial theme in philosophical discourse on the subject — namely, the inquiry into the feasibility of being motivated in a manner wholly devoid of narcissism (see MOTIVATION, MORAL). Immanuel Kant, like to Augustine, Levinas, and Murdoch, considers self-love a significant impediment to morality. Kant’s concerns are both practical and epistemological. Even when faced with significant sacrifices that seem to be driven by duty (refer to DUTY AND OBLIGATION), “it cannot be definitively concluded that the true motivating factor of the will was not, in fact, a hidden impulse of self-love” (2012: 4:407). Kant posits that a perilous characteristic of “the dear self” is its capacity to persuade us that our actions stem from obligation, while in fact, they are driven by more ignoble motivations (see to SELF-DECEPTION). Confronted with the profound and ubiquitous essence of narcissistic drive, several philosophers have pondered whether it is feasible or even advantageous to eliminate it. Jacques Lacan, inheriting Freud’s notion of narcissism, advances the idea significantly, positing that the ego is formed by an act of “narcissistic suicidal aggression” (Lacan 2006: 187). Jacques Derrida asserts that the endeavor to evade narcissism is erroneous; rather, we want to foster a “more welcoming, hospitable narcissism, one that is significantly more receptive to the experience of the other as other” (Derrida 1987: 199). For both Lacan and Derrida, narcissism, in some form, is inevitable — a fundamental characteristic of humanity.

Since Freud identified the narcissism of attractive women as a major example (1914/1957: 88–89), the idea of narcissism has inherently had a gendered connotation. In The Speculum of the Other Woman (1985), Luce Irigaray critiques the phallocentric perspectives of Freud and Lacan, while modern feminist philosophers have described feminine narcissism as both alienating (Bartky 1982) and possibly liberating (Garry 1982). The spectrum of views toward narcissism is as extensive as that of moral theories, indicating that Derrida may have been correct in asserting that we should not refer to “narcissism” in the singular, but rather to a multiplicity of “narcissisms” (1987: 199).

Refer to: Aristotle; Augustine of Hippo; Jacques Derrida; Duty and Obligation; Egoism; Sigmund Freud; Immanuel Kant; Emmanuel Levinas; Love; Moral Motivation; Iris Murdoch; Plato; Rationality; Reason and Passion; Jean-Jacques Rousseau; Self-Deception; Self-Respect and Self-Esteem

References

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— — 2013. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th edition). Washington, DC: Author.

Aristotle 2000. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Roger Crisp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bartky, Sandra Lee 1982. “Narcissism, Femininity and Alienation,” Social Theory and Practice vol. 8, pp. 127–143.

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— — 1913/1953. “Totem and Taboo,” in Strachey (ed.) Standard Edition vol. XIII, pp. 1–162.

— — 1914/1957. “On Narcissism: An Introduction,” in Strachey (ed.) Standard Edition vol. XIV, pp. 67–102.

— — 1917/1963. “Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Part III: General Theory of the Neuroses,” in Strachey (ed.) Standard Edition vol. XVI, pp.243–463.

Fromm, Erich 1964. The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil. New York: Harper & Row.

Garry, Ann 1982. “Narcissism and Vanity,” Social Theory and Practice vol. 8, pp. 145–153.

Irigaray, Luce 1985. Speculum of the Other Woman. Translated by G. C. Gill. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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Lasch, Christopher 1978. The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations. New York: Norton.

Lear, Jonathan 1993. “Plato’s Politics of Narcissism,” Apeiron vol. 26, pp. 137–159.

Levinas, Emmanuel 1987. “Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,” in Alphonso Lingis (ed.) Collected Philosophical Papers, pp. 47–60. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

Lunbeck, Elizabeth 2014. The Americanization of Narcissism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Murdoch, Iris 1999. “The Sublime and the Good,” in Existentialists and Mystics, pp. 205–220. New York: Penguin.

— — 2001a. “The Idea of Perfection,” in The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts, pp. 1–44. Abingdon: Routledge.

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Further Reading

Alford, C. Fred 1988. Narcissism: Socrates, the Frankfurt School, and Psychoanalytic Theory. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Blackburn, Simon 2014. Mirror, Mirror: The Uses and Abuses of Self-Love. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

DeArmitt, Pleshette 2016. The Right to Narcissism: A Case for an Im-possible Self-Love. New York: Fordham University Press.

Dombek, Kristin 2016. The Selfishness of Others: An Essay on the Fear of Narcissism. New York: FSG Originals.

Kernberg, Otto 1975. Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism. New York: Jason Aronson.

Kohut, Heinz 1971. The Analysis of the Self: A Systematic Approach to the Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders. Madison, CT: International Universities Press.

Miller, Alice 1982. The Drama of the Gifted Child: How Narcissistic Parents Form and Deform the Emotional Lives of their Talented Children. New York: Basic Books.