Crisis by Design? The Politics Behind the 2025 India–Pakistan Standoff

Historical Background: Partition and Hindutva

The India–Pakistan rivalry dates to the 1947 partition of British India along religious lines. The Muslim League’s two-nation theory – holding that Hindus and Muslims could not coexist in one nation – led to separate states for Hindus (India) and Muslims (Pakistan). The partition “triggered one of history’s largest mass migrations,” with “hundreds of thousands” killed in communal violence between Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. Decades later, Hindu-nationalist (“Hindutva”) movements have gained strength in India. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi (a Hindu nationalist), rights groups report a sharp rise in anti-Muslim sentiment and policies. For example, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom found that in 2024 “religious freedom conditions in India continued to deteriorate as attacks and discrimination against religious minorities continued to rise,” noting that Modi and his BJP “propagated hateful rhetoric and disinformation against Muslims”. Freedom House similarly warns that the Modi government has “presided over discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population”. One scholar notes Indian media are increasingly “dividing the country in the Hindu-Muslim…way,” which benefits the ruling Hindu-nationalist party. These trends have fueled longstanding fears among Indian Muslims and underpinned mistrust between New Delhi and Islamabad.

Pakistan’s Political Context in 2025

Pakistan entered 2025 in political and economic turmoil. Chronic instability and a deepening economic crisis (slow growth, record inflation and debt) have plagued the country. The February 2024 election was inconclusive: Imran Khan’s PTI (via allied independents) won the most seats, but Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif (Nawaz Sharif’s brother, of the ruling PML-N) was ultimately elected in coalition on March 4, 2024. Nawaz Sharif himself had just returned from exile after Pakistan’s Supreme Court cleared him to contest elections. In early 2025 Nawaz (75) remained PML-N chief and the de facto leader of the ruling party, even though Shehbaz (72) was Prime Minister. Nawaz’s daughter Maryam Nawaz was serving as Punjab’s chief minister. Amid this transition, Pakistan’s strategic direction was uncertain. In April 2025, Nawaz Sharif urged a diplomatic approach to rising India tensions – he had not publicly condemned the April 22 Pahalgam attack in Kashmir and instead told his party to “utilize all…diplomatic resources to restore peace”. His stance contrasted with hardline voices calling for retaliation.

The May 2025 Escalation: Events and Incidents

On 22–23 April 2025, gunmen attacked a tourist bus in Pahalgam, Kashmir, killing 26 Hindu civilians (22 were Hindus, according to some reports). India blamed Pakistan-based militants for the Pahalgam massacre. Prime Minister Modi cut short a foreign trip and vowed that the “perpetrators…and their collaborators…will be pursued to the ends of the earth,” though he did not explicitly name Pakistan. Home Minister Amit Shah and security chiefs flew to Kashmir, and India’s UN ambassador later justified retaliation as an “act of war” by Pakistan against India’s civilians.

In the early hours of 7 May 2025, India launched Operation Sindoor: air and missile strikes on nine locations inside Pakistan. Delhi said it targeted terrorist camps (linked to Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba) from which the Pahalgam attackers were directed. Indian officials described the operation as “focused, measured and non-escalatory,” striking only “terrorist infrastructure” (and explicitly not Pakistani military bases). Pakistan’s government immediately condemned the strikes as an “act of war.” Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif convened a National Security Committee and vowed retaliation, saying India had “ignited an inferno in the region”.

Both sides then exchanged heavy fire. According to Pakistan’s military spokesman, Indian drone and missile attacks on 7–8 May hit civilian and military areas: one civilian died in Sindh province and four soldiers were wounded in Lahore. Pakistan reported shooting down dozens of Indian drones (claiming 25 drones destroyed on May 8). India said it intercepted a Pakistani overnight drone-and-missile strike on northern military targets, neutralizing all incoming weapons. India also reported several civilian casualties: the Indian foreign ministry said cross-border shelling on 7 May killed 13 Indian civilians and wounded 59 (plus one Indian soldier). Pakistan, for its part, said six people (civilians and soldiers) died in cross-border fire on the Pakistan side.

Flares and explosions lit up the skies in border areas. At least 48 people were killed overall in the two-day clash (approximately 32 in Pakistan, 15 in India, according to media tallies). Claims flew: Pakistan’s military claimed to have shot down Indian jets (unconfirmed by independent sources) and even alleged Indian planes had hit a Pakistani hydroelectric plant, while India denied any jet losses and said it did not attack civilian targets. Pakistan’s ISPR urged unity; the Senate in Islamabad unanimously passed resolutions condemning India. On 8 May, Shehbaz Sharif again denounced the strikes, “condemning in the strongest terms” India’s violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. He told US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that India’s missile and drone strikes had killed 31 Pakistani civilians, injuring dozens. Rubio (briefing reporters) said the US was “closely monitoring” and urged both sides to de-escalate. The EU and UN Secretary-General likewise voiced alarm, calling on India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint.

Clash as Political Theater: Narratives and Motives

Observers quickly noted that both governments seized political advantage from the crisis. Indian officials blamed Pakistan and portrayed the strikes as necessary self-defense against cross-border terror, while downplaying any civilian harm. Pakistan’s leadership, by contrast, accused India of using the situation for “propaganda.” Islamabad’s foreign ministry flatly denied Pakistani attacks on Indian border posts, calling those claims “entirely unfounded, politically motivated, and part of a reckless propaganda campaign aimed at maligning Pakistan”. Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif warned retaliation was “increasingly certain” after India’s strikes. On the Indian side, media and BJP leaders stressed that Pakistan needed to answer for harboring militants.

Many analysts see the crisis as politically driven, not a spontaneous popular uprising. For India’s ruling BJP, Kashmir and Pakistan have long been electoral issues. Analysts recall that in 2019 Prime Minister Modi’s Balakot airstrike (after a Kashmir suicide bombing) dramatically boosted BJP nationalism in the election. In 2025, some experts argue the Pahalgam attack and the ensuing strikes similarly rallied Indian public support around the government. The International Crisis Group noted that, domestically, the violence was “a shot in the arm” for Modi’s BJP: even the opposition Congress backed a tough stance on Pakistan. (Another scholar observed that India’s emphasis on a peaceful “New Kashmir” narrative was punctured by the attack – implying a rally-against-evil narrative took over.)

On the Pakistan side, opposition parties closed ranks with the PML-N-led government. The Pahalgam attack, while unrelated to Pakistani politics, gave Pakistan’s leaders an opportunity to claim moral high ground and national unity. In parliament and the streets, parties from PML-N to Imran Khan’s proxies condemned India. Some Pakistani commentators say this unity plays into Nawaz Sharif’s interest by shoring up his new coalition. However, Nawaz’s own public stance was cautious. He did not immediately denounce the Kashmir killing, and instead – reportedly in private discussions with his brother – urged that the government seek diplomatic solutions rather than an aggressive response. That moderation suggests Sharif was wary of an all-out war in Pakistan’s already unstable situation.

The Pahalgam Attack and Propaganda

The April 2025 massacre in Pahalgam (26 tourists killed) was the immediate trigger for the crisis. Indian authorities swiftly blamed Pakistan-based terrorists for the ambush. Modi and Shah framed the victims as innocents murdered by cross-border militants, and they launched the later strikes in that name. Critics, however, have accused Indian authorities of using the horror for political messaging. In the weeks before the attack, the Modi government had touted rising tourism in Kashmir as evidence of “normalcy” after years of unrest. Former Kashmiri leader Omar Abdullah warned that such claims were dangerously optimistic: “The situation [in Kashmir] is not normal,” he said in 2024, “and talk of tourism being an indicator of normalcy…put[s] tourists in danger”. Tragically, the Pahalgam killings affirmed Abdullah’s warning. Political scientist Sumantra Bose later commented that the attack “punctured the balloon of the ‘New Kashmir’ narrative”. In other words, the government’s propaganda of peace in Kashmir had its image shattered by violence.

After Pahalgam, Indian officials warned of vengeance, and social media buzzed with calls for retaliation. The Wire’s Anand Sahay argued that this was the effect of an “over-propaganda” environment: the public had been led to expect an immediate military strike on Pakistan, and Modi did indeed suspend the Indus Waters Treaty and speak of punishment, though he stopped short of an outright declaration of war. In Pakistan, the attack was used to justify India’s subsequent actions as unprovoked aggression. Both narratives – India’s revenge for terrorism, Pakistan’s exposing of Hindu nationalist aggression – have been advanced in domestic politics. In sum, the Pahalgam killings have been swept into larger propaganda campaigns on both sides: one side framing them as an act of war by Pakistan, the other as a reminder of extremist ideology’s dangers. Neutral observers caution that the real victim is Kashmiri civilians caught in between.

Modi’s Political Calculus

For Prime Minister Modi and the BJP, the May crisis fit a familiar pattern. Nationalist rhetoric about Pakistan has long been a BJP rallying cry. In last year’s election, even without a real-time conflict, Modi blamed his opponents as “Pakistan friends” to fire up voters. Five years earlier, the Balakot strikes were credited with boosting BJP morale. In 2025, analysts note that the Kashmir attack and subsequent standoff gave Modi fresh nationalist momentum. An ICG analyst said the events served as “a shot in the arm” for his government domestically. By meeting Kashmiri anger with a show of resolve, Modi reinforced his image as a strong leader defending India. As one columnist put it, Modi spoke of pursuing the attackers “to the ends of the earth,” invoking both Hindu mythic duty and national pride, without mentioning Pakistan by name. The BJP’s tight control of media and social networks then amplified those themes.

However, experts also warn of overreach. The Wire’s Anand Sahay noted that untrammeled propaganda raised public expectations for an all-out victory, which in reality would be difficult or dangerous. Indeed, after initial war rhetoric, Modi’s government delivered mainly symbolic measures (e.g. suspending the water treaty) rather than full-scale war. Still, from a political standpoint, the crisis did boost the BJP’s narrative of keeping India safe and strong. Whether that translates into votes in future elections is unclear – the next general election is not until 2029 – but in the immediate term it rallied the party’s base.

Sharif’s Balancing Act

In Pakistan, the Sharif brothers responded differently to the crisis. Shehbaz Sharif (PM) and Nawaz (PML-N chief) both condemned India’s May strikes as violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty. The government portrayed itself as a defender of the nation. Unlike in 2019, Pakistan’s military establishment publicly backed the government’s decision to refrain from immediate war, focusing instead on shooting down drones and firing back only across the Line of Control. Nawaz Sharif had instructed his ministers to emphasize diplomacy; Pakistan’s media quoted him saying he “is not keen on taking an aggressive position” and wants to use all diplomatic channels to restore peace. In practice, Pakistan did not launch a major retaliation, and parliament united in vows to “meet this challenge.”

For Sharif, the conflict offered both opportunity and risk. The immediate “rally-round-the-flag” effect played in his favour: Islamabad’s cohesion in response to India could strengthen his shaky coalition. Several parties – including remnants of Imran Khan’s PTI (via independents) – publicly joined in condemning India, giving the government a show of unanimity. However, the danger of escalation also constrained him. Analysts note that Sharif’s cautious rhetoric reflected a desire to avoid a full-scale war Pakistan might not sustain economically or militarily. By engaging the US and UN to call for peace, he signaled moderation. In short, Sharif has tried to walk a line: appearing strong at home while not actually dragging Pakistan into a war it can ill afford. Most observers agree that if anyone “wins” this standoff in Pakistan’s politics, it is the notion of a united civilian government – but at the cost of raising expectations it may struggle to meet.

Voices and Reactions

Officials and experts on both sides voiced very different interpretations:

Pakistan: Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif denounced India’s strikes as an “act of aggression” and said Pakistan had the right to respond. His foreign minister insisted the strikes were “unprovoked” and killed civilians. The Pakistani military spokesman reported civilians and soldiers harmed by Indian drones, and the ISPR called for unity and readiness. Islamabad’s foreign office labeled India’s charges a “politically motivated…propaganda campaign”. Opposition figures and Punjab’s Maryam Nawaz echoed calls for vigilance.

India: New Delhi’s spokesmen emphasized targeting terrorists, not Pakistan’s army. The Indian defense ministry said it had hit only militant camps and had intercepted any Pakistani missiles, underlining that no civilian installations were struck. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman and others told parliament that the government acted firmly yet responsibly. On 8 May Modi urged the nation to remain united and blamed “external enemies” in general, but did not blame Pakistan by name.

Analysts: Kashmir expert Sumantra Bose (Al Jazeera) warned Modi’s officials that their “New Kashmir” peace narrative had been shattered. International Crisis Group’s Paulo Donthi observed the domestic boost the attack gave Modi. Middle East Eye noted that accusing Pakistan of sponsoring terror is a “recurring theme” in BJP politics. Others pointed out that ordinary Indians and Pakistanis are mostly tired of war: pollsters say public focus remains on jobs and inflation, not cross-border conflict.

International: The US, EU, UN, China and others all urged calm. US Secretary Rubio “called for both sides to de-escalate” and reaffirmed American commitment to South Asian stability. UN Secretary-General Guterres and EU leaders similarly urged maximum restraint. Even ally Saudi Arabia quietly cautioned India to avoid further escalation.

Toward Peace: Separating Motives from the People’s Will

As tensions ease, commentators emphasize the human cost and the need to put politics aside. Both countries have nuclear arsenals, and the risk of broader war is grave. Crackdowns and reprisals will only breed more extremism on both sides of the Line of Control. Analysts agree that if political narratives fueled this crisis, popular will is the antidote. Kashmiris – especially Muslims in both Indian and Pakistani Kashmir – overwhelmingly want peace, not conflict. Farmers, shopkeepers, students and working families all suffer when borders are hot.

The recent clash shows how easily tragic events can be co-opted into nationalist theater. Peace advocates argue that India and Pakistan share many common interests: trade, water, environmental security, and regional stability. New Delhi and Islamabad owe it to their people to keep dialogue open. As Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif’s de-escalation appeals and US calls indicate, diplomacy must prevail over politics of revenge. Both sides should investigate the Kashmir attack transparently, prosecute perpetrators through law enforcement (not force), and resume counterterror cooperation.

Sources: Official statements and reporting (Reuters, RFE/RL, Al Jazeera, Guardian, Reuters) and expert analysis, among others.