Yemen Is About to Break In Two
Inside the Lightning Campaign Reshaping Yemen—and the Proxy War Fueling It
Yemen has lived through revolutions, foreign interventions, famine, epidemics, and one of the world’s most devastating civil wars. Yet somehow, the country has found itself lurching into crisis once more—only this time, it’s not the Houthis dragging the nation back into chaos. Over the past several days, a powerful southern faction known as the Southern Transitional Council has launched a stunning territorial blitz, sweeping across eastern Yemen, seizing key oil fields, and conquering cities with a speed and efficiency that blindsided nearly everyone watching. The internationally recognized Yemeni government, already fragile after years of war, now teeters on the edge of outright collapse. And in the shadows, the unmistakable fingerprints of the United Arab Emirates are shaping a conflict that is rapidly evolving into a major proxy showdown with Saudi Arabia.
This new crisis represents one of the most dramatic shifts in Yemen’s balance of power since the fall of Sana’a a decade ago—and if events continue to spiral, Yemen could soon be divided in two once again. Before diving into the shock offensive defining this moment, it’s important to understand the complicated landscape that made the collapse possible.
Setting the Stage: Yemen’s Three-Way Balance of Power
Even for seasoned Middle East observers, Yemen’s military and political map has always been a maze of overlapping alliances, tribal networks, foreign influence, and shifting frontlines. For years, the country has been carved into zones controlled by three major factions, each backed by a different regional heavyweight.
The first and most internationally notorious faction is the Houthi movement, entrenched in the capital city of Sana’a and ruling over the densely populated western heartlands. Their military strength has been underwritten by Iran, which has spent years flooding Houthi territory with drones, weapons, and cash in an effort to expand its network of proxy militias stretching from Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen.
Then there is the internationally recognized Yemeni government—nominally the political authority of the entire country, but in practice, limited to several central cities like Marib and Taiz, alongside vast stretches of mostly empty desert in the northeast. Their survival depends heavily on Saudi military protection and on the tribal alliances Riyadh has spent decades cultivating.
And finally, there is the Southern Transitional Council: a separatist movement formed in 2017 but rooted in the long memory of South Yemen, the formerly independent socialist state that existed until unity in 1990. The STC governs Yemen’s southern coastline, including the critical port of Aden, and maintains an ambiguous, often hostile relationship with the Yemeni government despite technically being part of the same anti-Houthi coalition.
Crucially, the STC has something the Yemeni government does not—its own elite fighting force. The Hadhrami Elite Forces, originally established to combat Al-Qaeda, operate with a level of autonomy and tactical capability that makes them one of Yemen’s most effective armed units. These fighters are well supplied, well trained, and most importantly, well funded by the United Arab Emirates. The UAE has emerged as one of the most ambitious regional powers of the past decade, backing militias and political movements across Sudan, Somalia, and Libya. Supporting the STC is part of a broader Emirati strategy to cultivate friendly non-state actors who can reshape the political order in the Gulf and the Horn of Africa.
Until late November, all three Yemeni factions existed in a tense but durable equilibrium. The Houthis dominated the west, the STC governed the strategic south, and the Yemeni government clung to what remained in the center and northeast. None of the foreign patrons—Iran, Saudi Arabia, or the UAE—seemed eager to ignite a new phase of the conflict.
That stability, fragile as it was, has now been shattered.
A Shock Offensive That No One Expected
The first sign of trouble emerged on November 29th at the Masila oil fields—one of Yemen’s largest and most important sources of revenue. Yemeni government–aligned forces, backed by Saudi tribal networks, moved to secure the area amid rising tensions with the STC. The STC had grown suspicious that a secret peace deal between the Yemeni government and the Houthis might be imminent, a deal that would leave the southern separatists exposed and politically isolated.
Blocking production at the Masila fields created energy shortages across the region and hurt STC-controlled areas in particular. The separatists quickly began mobilizing their forces, and by December 2nd, they were advancing north toward the territorial line dividing government and STC lands.
The real shock came on December 3rd, when the STC launched a full-scale offensive on the city of Seiyun—a major urban center with a prewar population of more than 130,000 and home to a presidential palace, military headquarters, and an important airport. Yemeni officials believed the city could withstand an assault. Instead, it fell in a matter of hours.
The Hadhrami Elite Forces spearheaded a ruthless, well-coordinated attack, bombarding key targets before storming the city in a lightning sweep that left government defenders fleeing in disarray. By nightfall, the STC held every major military and administrative facility in Seiyun, and their fighters wasted no time pushing further across the province.
What followed was a rapid cascade of victories. Town after town fell with minimal resistance, occasionally without a single shot fired, as government forces abandoned their posts rather than confront the Emirati-backed offensive. Even temporary Saudi pressure, which briefly forced the STC to relinquish a handful of captured sites, ultimately proved meaningless. STC counterattacks reclaimed those zones almost immediately.
By December 8th, the separatists had secured major population centers across the former territory of South Yemen and were closing in on the remaining pockets of government control. The old South Yemeni flag began reappearing across the region. And for the first time in decades, the political geography of a divided Yemen began to look not just possible—but imminent.
Why the Yemeni Government Is Now the Weakest Faction in the War
The sudden collapse of government defenses in the east has not only undermined Yemen’s internationally recognized leadership—it has exposed how little leverage the government actually has left.
The STC now controls the majority of Yemen’s remaining oil reserves, representing more than 80% of the nation’s proven resources. These fields were once the financial lifeblood of the Yemeni state; now they sit under separatist control.
They have also secured vital mineral deposits, key trade corridors, and almost every significant urban center in the former South Yemen. Population-wise, the STC appears to now govern more than 90%—and perhaps as high as 95%—of the residents of the old South.
Meanwhile, Yemeni government troops remain locked in defensive positions around Taiz and along the Houthi frontlines, unable to redeploy without risking immediate exploitation by Houthi forces. Attempting to negotiate a peace accord with the Houthis might free up soldiers to fight the STC, but doing so now risks triggering a Houthi offensive or a devastating betrayal once the government withdraws fighters from the north.
For the Yemeni state, it is a classic lose-lose scenario: move troops and risk annihilation, or keep troops in place and watch the STC devour the country piece by piece.
There are unconfirmed reports that Saudi Arabia may be preparing a more direct intervention as armored vehicles appear to be moving toward the border. But Riyadh’s reputation in Yemen is already battered by years of military failures, and the Saudis are painfully aware that Emirati-supplied long-range drones could target Saudi territory if the conflict escalates.
Saudi Arabia does not want war. The UAE does not want to back down. And Yemen may be caught in the middle of their regional rivalry at the worst possible moment.
A New State in the Making?
The STC’s goals are no mystery. The group has openly sought to restore an independent South Yemen for years, and now—supported by Emirati power and riding a wave of military victories—they are closer than ever to achieving it.
Their public messaging has shifted, too, becoming tailored for Western audiences. Their leaders speak of “stability,” “security,” and “counterterrorism,” framing themselves as a responsible southern authority rather than another militia carving up a broken state. They know that if Yemen collapses completely, the world will face a choice between recognizing the Houthis or recognizing them. And the STC intends to ensure they look like the least dangerous option.
If the internationally recognized Yemeni government implodes—as seems increasingly plausible—the geopolitical map of the region would shift overnight. An independent South Yemen, backed by the UAE, would sit directly at the mouth of the Red Sea, astride one of the world’s most vital maritime routes. Saudi Arabia would lose strategic depth. Iran’s Houthi allies would consolidate the north. And the UAE would gain an enormous foothold in a region where it has spent years trying to assert influence.
It is difficult to overstate how transformative this would be.
Where Yemen Goes From Here
As of this writing, Yemen stands at an inflection point—one that could determine the future of the Arabian Peninsula for decades. The delicate three-way balance that once restrained the warring factions is gone, replaced by a landscape where one actor is surging, one is cornered, and one is waiting for an opportunity to strike.
The coming days may bring direct Saudi intervention, a Houthi gambit, or a full STC push to declare independence. Or the crisis could escalate into a regional proxy war with long-range drones, foreign mercenaries, oil infrastructure attacks, and state collapse unfolding in real time.
The only thing that seems certain is that Yemen is once again standing on the edge of a precipice—fractured, exhausted, and facing yet another transformation forced upon it by armed groups and foreign powers.
If the situation deteriorates further, the world may witness the birth of a new state, the collapse of an old one, and a dramatic reshaping of Gulf geopolitics. And as always, Yemen’s civilians will pay the highest price.
For now, the country waits to see what comes next. The world should be watching with equal urgency.
About the Creator
Lawrence Lease
Alaska born and bred, Washington DC is my home. I'm also a freelance writer. Love politics and history.



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