Syria Needs Security – Can Al-Sharaa Build a United Army to Provide It?

Syria Needs Security – Can Al-Sharaa Build a United Army to Provide It?

As Syria enters a new chapter in its protracted and painful history, the question of national security looms larger than ever. The once-thriving country, now fractured by civil war, foreign interference, and ideological divides, is in desperate need of stability. With various factions vying for power and influence, the prospect of unifying these elements under a single, credible military force seems far-fetched. Yet some believe that one man might be capable of attempting the near impossible—Farouk Al-Sharaa.

A veteran statesman and former vice president under Bashar al-Assad, Al-Sharaa is one of the few figures in Syria’s political landscape who maintains a degree of credibility across different sectors of society. Known for his pragmatism, diplomatic finesse, and relative independence from the bloody tactics of the regime, Al-Sharaa has long been seen by some Syrians and international observers as a potential bridge between opposing camps.

A Fragmented Military Landscape

The Syrian Civil War has left the nation with a splintered military framework. What once was the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), loyal to the Assad regime, has been deeply eroded by years of attrition, defections, and reliance on foreign militias. On the other side, various rebel groups—some moderate, some extremist—continue to hold sway in parts of the country, particularly in the north. Kurdish-led forces, notably the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), control large swathes of northeastern Syria, with the backing of the United States. Meanwhile, Iranian, Russian, and Turkish military interests further complicate any effort to build a truly national army.

In this fragmented environment, creating a unified, inclusive, and professional national army that represents all Syrians is a monumental task. It requires not just military coordination, but political will, reconciliation efforts, and international support. The question, then, is whether Al-Sharaa has the tools—and the time—to attempt such a feat.

Al-Sharaa’s Unique Position

Al-Sharaa, who has largely remained out of the spotlight in recent years, is viewed by some Syrians as a “clean” politician compared to others who were directly involved in the violent suppression of protests in 2011 and the ensuing war. He has a long history of serving the state, not the individual, and was reportedly marginalized by Assad for advocating a political solution to the crisis rather than military escalation.

His absence from the regime’s inner circle during the bloodiest phases of the conflict may actually work in his favor now. He is one of the few figures who might be able to engage in dialogue with moderate opposition groups, exiled politicians, and even Kurdish factions—should the right diplomatic framework emerge.

The Challenges Ahead

The notion of building a united Syrian army under Al-Sharaa is still speculative and fraught with challenges. Firstly, he would need broad-based political legitimacy. This means not only a return to the political scene with some form of national or international backing, but also the willingness of other power centers in Syria—including Assad’s loyalists, Kurdish leaders, and potentially even moderate rebels—to work with him

Secondly, there are practical obstacles. Trust is in short supply, and years of bloodshed have hardened divisions. Integrating former enemies into a single fighting force would require a deeply nuanced approach, including transitional justice, decentralized command structures, and perhaps most critically, security guarantees from international powers.

Third, foreign interference remains a critical barrier. Iran and Russia have little interest in reducing their influence in Syria, while Turkey views any Kurdish involvement as a direct threat. The United States and European Union, meanwhile, remain wary of committing significant resources to Syria without clear pathways to reform and accountability.

A Glimmer of Possibility

Despite these challenges, history has shown that countries torn apart by war can, under the right circumstances, reconstruct their military institutions. Examples from post-genocide Rwanda to post-conflict Colombia provide some measure of hope. In Syria’s case, a figure like Al-Sharaa might serve as the catalyst for a gradual, phased approach to unification—starting perhaps with joint security councils in key regions, and eventually leading to a centralized but representative national force.

For this to happen, however, Syrians themselves must see the value in reconciliation over retribution. International actors must support—not manipulate—the process. And Al-Sharaa, if he is to play a role, would need both political space and grassroots backing to lead such an ambitious endeavor.

Conclusion

Syria’s future depends on more than just ending the war—it hinges on building a durable peace, anchored by national institutions that all Syrians can trust. Security is the bedrock of that peace, and a united army could be its cornerstone. Whether Al-Sharaa is the man to forge that army remains uncertain, but his reputation as a diplomat and statesman offers a rare sliver of hope in a country scarred by division. For Syria, even the possibility of unity is worth exploring.