Creatures of Fiction Literary Analysis

The writing “Creatures of Fiction” by Peter Van Inwagen explores the philosophical notion that logically if we are able to describe a fictional character it must exist. He compares this view of philosophers that use the Meinongian perspective to that of the views of philosophers using an anti-Meinongian perspective. Using various examples through literature, particularly 19th century, Van Inwagen argues that without the use of a Meinongian perspective we are not looking deep enough into what is being said. If by only taking the literal description we miss the underlying meanings behind the text in some circumstances. The issue with this is that explaining fictional characters and giving them definitive properties can be very difficult. Knowing when to look beyond the literal writings for a deeper context, or not to look deeper can be a large part of that issue.

When first attempting to explain the concept at the beginning of the writing, Van Inwagen gives the example that some philosophers intend to assert more than what is being said when they state an object does not exist. He points out that a sentence using this statement can mean it’s obvious and literal sense, however when more is being implied in this way, there are objects that among their normal characteristics and properties, also carry the property of non-existence. Essentially a Meinongian perspective can describe an object even though part of its description is non-existence as opposed to that object being non-existent. The writing uses the example of a Meinongian saying “Mr. Pickwick does not exist”. From a Meinongian perspective, there is a Mr. Pickwick and that object has the characteristic of non-existence. From a non-Meinongian perspective Mr. Pickwick would mean that the object or person does not exist and refers to nothing, therefore it could have no additional characteristics. He further adds later on, when speaking directly about characters in a novel that they do exist. A character in a novel can exist because it is a character. Some characters may be based on a generalization where others can be based on actual people. Characters can of course be nothing more than a creative construct, however they are given attributes and properties and therefore exist as a character.

Van Inwagen points to the fact that the context in which an object exists is relative to when it is being used. Meaning, for example a character in a novel based in the 1800’s did not exist then, however the character does exist now even though the time it resided in was hundreds of years ago. The existence of the character is only literary however and belongs to what Van Inwagen calls creatures of fiction part of a broader category he has named as theoretical entities of literary criticism. Theoretical entities of literary criticism use theoretical vocabularies to convey more interesting context either as a truth or non-truth. They are not only used for literary criticism says Van Inwagen but are used in various disciplines including sciences and give underlying meaning. Because of this one could not visit with the character, find historical information or go beyond what is presented in the writings about them. Even though the character exists as a literary device, it would still maintain the property on non-existence.

Just as Van Inwagen puts forward a reasonable and well thought out argument that a creature of fiction exists, he also reasons as to why there may be objections to that rationality. One main point he offers right away in part IV is that although the character Mrs. Gamp has properties of an entity that does exist, she is missing other fundamental properties. If these properties are absent in a character and are part of an object that exists then it is objectionable that the character Mrs. Gamp in fact does not exist and this theory could be applied to all creatures of fiction. He further states that no one in her era had the properties that were given to the character Mrs. Gamp and therefore no one with her properties was existent, this arguably means Mrs. Gamp could not exist. However, it can be argued that the properties the character does have can be related to the missing fundamental properties required for her existing. Using a deeper insight into the text used to describe Mrs. Gamp can allow us to theorize the additional properties she would require. An example used to explain this is Mrs. Gamp has a fondness for gin. This implies that the character drinks alcohol or could be given the property of being a drinker or a drunk. By describing non-tangible characteristics of Mrs. Gamp, tangible characteristics can be surmised. The relation between these characteristics in literary devices is similar to how we speak. Often in speech we will use words that are incorrect or missing context because we know that the details are implied. For this argument Van Inwagen re-iterates that the properties of the fictional character are literary and one of those properties therefore can be existence, providing existence is a property.

There can be difficulty with a fictional character when trying to assign properties to it with an explicit definition. Because a fictional character may have properties that are impossible for a real-world person to have, assigning a characteristic definitively may not make any sense. A person in the real-world could be like a fictional character by having the same properties assigned to them but not with the fictional values given to those properties. As Van Inwagen states that if it meant to have the properties Mrs. Gamp has, a “real” woman could not be like Mrs. Gamp because a “real” woman could not have been a creation of Dickens, a character in his novel or be a theoretical entity of criticism. However, a “real” woman could be similar or like Mrs. Gamp if she has the same properties Mrs. Gamp has ascribed to her.

“Creatures of Fiction” explores the philosophical notion fictional characters must exist because they can be given properties and described in the same way an object or person can be in the real-world. Van Inwagen poses a strong argument as to why this is true and how more can be seen in literary construct than what is written to give more depth and answers to what essential properties a character may be missing. He compares views of philosophers that use the Meinongian and an anti-Meinongian perspective with examples from various pieces of literature found in the 18th and 19th century, particularly Charles Dickens. Van Inwagen argues that without the use of a Meinongian perspective we are missing characteristics about characters that have been written about and that taking only the literal descriptions and truths about what is said is not the intended way for interpreting the readings. He offers a short objective opinion against his thesis but ultimately sides with the belief that a fictional character does exist. The problems with this argument are that explaining fictional characters can be very difficult as can giving them definitive properties. One needs to learn when to look beyond the literal writings for a deeper context and when not to look deeper and take what is written as a truth.

Works Cited

Van Inwagen, Peter. “Creatures of Fiction.” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 4, [North American Philosophical Publications, University of Illinois Press], 1977, pp. 299–308, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009682.