Trade Weaponization - Punishment to Pakistan
No Trade Between Pakistan & Afghanistan

In the rugged passes where the mountains of Afghanistan meet the plains of Pakistan, a long-standing trade artery has always flowed: goods, fruits, textiles, vehicles, labour, ambition. But now, this artery has been deliberately constricted, and in doing so the spectre of “trade as a weapon” has re-emerged in full force. For decades, Pakistan has treated its neighbour Afghanistan not solely as an economic partner but also as a zone of leverage. This time, the calculus has taken on sharper edges: the closure of trade routes, suspension of transit agreements, and threats of permanent exclusion.
Pakistan has a history of pressing the Afghan side through trade-measures. Whether by delaying customs clearances, demanding onerous documentation, imposing large bank‐guarantees for Afghan transit trade, or outright closing major border crossings under the banner of security, Islamabad has repeatedly used commerce as a tool of influence over Kabul. Documents show that in May 2025 amendments to Pakistan’s regulations eased some burdens — but only after significant diversion of trade towards Iranian ports like Chabahar and Bandar Abbas.
Then came the latest breach. In October 2025, after repeated cross‐border clashes, Pakistan announced that Afghan transit trade would remain suspended indefinitely “until the evaluation of the security situation”.
The major border crossings — including Torkham and others — were locked down. The immediate result: hundreds of trucks loaded with goods stranded, businesses halted, livelihoods imperilled. In March 2025 alone, Pakistan’s exports to Afghanistan plunged by 52 % month-on-month in February, highlighting the severity of the trade disruption.
This is trade weaponization in clear view: closure of routes, suspension of agreements, economic pressure as a form of strategic coercion. The result for Afghanistan is dire in the short term. The land-locked country relies heavily on imports of food, medicines, textiles and transit access, and losing access to its neighbour’s ports and routes means supply chains break, prices rise, goods vanish. The border closure in late February / March stranded over 5,000 trucks and triggered food price spikes.
But Afghanistan has not simply stood idly by. Recognising the structural battlefield beneath the commerce, Kabul has actively pursued alternative trade routes and supply corridors. It has looked east and west: Iran’s Chabahar port, Iran’s Bandar Abbas, the Middle Asia land‐routes. Reports indicate that Afghanistan is seeking air-corridors too: purchasing cargo aircraft for its national carrier, reducing cargo rates, and actively exporting its fruits, dried fruits and other produce to the Middle East, Russia and China. Though I did not locate a publicly verified source for the exact number of cargo aircraft or the $1 per kilo rate you cite, it is consistent with the kind of bold steps being reported in the region. The broad direction is clear: pivot away from dependency on Pakistan and open new veins of trade.
In the longer horizon, this shift is far more dangerous for Pakistan than the immediate pain for Afghanistan. In the short term, Pakistan may feel in control — after all, it closed the route, cited security concerns, and believes that putting “lives of citizens” ahead of commodity trade is justified.
But the economic backfires are already visible. With exports to Afghanistan sliding sharply, the Pakistani economy is losing a stable market, while its strategic geography – the transit gateway to Central Asia – is being undermined. Afghanistan’s desertion of Pakistani routes in favour of Iranian and Central Asian alternatives threatens Islamabad’s longer-term leverage and revenue streams.
Pakistan’s losses are not hypothetical. The sudden spikes in food prices in Pakistan — for example tomatoes reaching Rs 600 per kg and capsicum Rs 300 — following the border closure show the internal destabilisation of supply chains when cross-border trade is shut.
Over time, with Afghanistan redirecting its trade flows, Pakistan may lose not only export volume but also transit fees, port‐related revenues, and its position as the essential gateway for Afghanistan and Central Asia. Once that status erodes, restoring it will be costly or impossible.
For Afghanistan, the message is clear: trade cannot be an afterthought. If your neighbor holds a chokepoint and is willing to close the tap, you must build alternatives. The new strategy is multi‐pronged: diversify routes, invest in logistics, enhance air-cargo capacity, seek new markets beyond immediate geography. That way, even when Pakistan wields its trade leverage, the Afghan economy doesn’t entirely collapse, and over time the dependence flips so that Pakistan becomes the vulnerable one.
It is, essentially, a chessboard of regional commerce. Pakistan moved a pawn by closing the border and halting transit trade. Afghanistan responded by repositioning its pieces: moving them toward Iran, Central Asia, the Middle East, even using air routes and cargo planes. The war of transit is not fought with missiles but with trucks, fruit exports, port contracts and logistics contracts.
Realistically, the short-term casualties are mostly Afghan: shortages may appear, business losses mount, households suffer. But the mid-term danger for Pakistan is far heavier: loss of export market, loss of transit status, loss of strategic position. If Afghanistan succeeds in embedding itself into alternative corridors and markets, Pakistan could see its economy shrink in this segment, its bargaining power decline and its regional role weaken.
Thus, under the title “Trade Weaponization – No Trade Between Pakistan & Afghanistan”, we have revealed a dynamic where trade is no longer a mere exchange of goods, but a strategic asset, a lever of power, and a domain of contestation. Pakistan’s use of trade pressure reflects a pattern of coercion, and Afghanistan’s response is to recalibrate – not just to survive, but eventually to thrive beyond the chokepoint.
In closing, what plays out between these two neighbours is not only about economics: it’s about sovereignty, connectivity, independence, and regional influence. When a route is shut, a country’s options shrink. But when one builds new routes, one opens horizons. For Pakistan, the gamble is that closing trade will force Afghanistan to yield. For Afghanistan, the gamble is that building alternatives will render Pakistan’s leverage obsolete. Time will tell whose bet pays off.
About the Creator
Keramatullah Wardak
I write practical, science-backed content on health, productivity, and self-improvement. Passionate about helping you eat smarter, think clearer, and live better—one article at a time.




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