POLITICS OF CPEC

The politics of CPEC

Introduction:

China’s global rise has been presented in sharp contrast to the Western global order. The discourse of mutual benefit and non-interference has been maintained by not just China but also the countries that it engages with. A similar discourse has been deployed in Pakistan. However, discrepancies to these promises and hopes have not been hard to spot. In order to fully understand the implications of the Chinese presence in the third world, particularly in Pakistan, I look at the effects of Chinese engagement on the political economic structure of Pakistan. An analysis of Pakistan’s political economic structure, Pakistan’s history of infrastructure development, China’s foreign policy and national interests, and the basis of Pakistan–China friendship is utilized to understand how the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is interacting and is expected to interact with the state structure of Pakistan.

CPEC and the strategic interests:

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has become a “game-changer” not only for pol- icymakers but also for common citizens of China and Pakistan because of its potential bene- fits in the economic prosperity and sustainable development in the lives of individuals. Recently, scholars have shown a great interest in researching the eminence of CPEC. Despite prodigious efforts of scholars, the question “how CPEC would influence living stan- dards of rural women and what they perceive?” has been remained unanswered. The pres- ent study is the first attempt to unearth the perceptions of rural areas’ women towards CPEC. We collected empirical evidence through a structured questionnaire from 302 edu- cated rural women and interviewing 32 uneducated rural women. The following major con- clusions are drawn through structural equation modeling via AMOS 21: the rural women significantly directly perceive new opportunities through CPEC; however, they perceive that the CPEC would not directly influence their quality of life and self-enhancement, but through the development of these rural areas. Rural development partially mediates the relationship between CPEC development and perceived opportunities while it fully mediates the relation- ships between CPEC development and quality of life as well as between CPEC develop- ment and self-enhancement. Policymakers need to emphasize on development of rural areas that would improve living standards of poor communities. The government needs to meet the expectations of poor communities and rural women to ensure their sustainable development.

Before we begin to understand the possible implications of Chinese engagement in Pakistan, personified by the CPEC, it is important to understand what the project means for both the states. An understanding of the strategic importance of the project and how the project interacts with the historical interests of both nations will better equip us to analyze the CPEC in terms of its political and social impacts.

Pakistan Muslim League (N) assumed office in 2013 after its sweeping victory in the general elections 2013 of the National Assembly. The regime, led by two main protagonists—the Sharif brothers—was all about the economy: the Sharif’s had sold its vote bank the dream of a prosperous economy backed by a strong infrastructure network (Small, 2015). All the ambitious plans of motorways, industrial zones, and fixing energy crisis could not be financed locally and the Sharif government knew where to look for the investments. During this time, China, rethinking its economic policy that had sustained China's growth for over three decades, was ambitiously looking to build an integrated South Asian infrastructure to connect interior China to the ports of Indian Ocean. The infrastructural investments had become prerequisite for maintaining high growth rates in the newly growing provinces of Yunnan and Xinjiang. China looked for collaboration from India and Pakistan. Li Keqiang—the Chinese Prime Minister —first visited India with his ambitious proposals. However, India found its economic ally in Japan instead. Next was Pakistan’s turn.

However, convincing China to invest in Pakistan would not be an easy task for the Sharif government. Many of Chinese initiatives had languished in the past due to the incumbent regime’s lack of political will (Small, 2015). However, the Pakistani government’s commitment was to ease these qualms for China. Li arrived Pakistan on 22nd May, 2013 with an ambitious proposal of regional connectivity and resolution of Pakistan’s energy crisis. Pakistani civil and military leadership welcomed Li with grand gestures. From here on, the Xinjiang-Gwadar connection idea picked up pace. China was also willing to help Pakistan alleviate its energy crisis through building hydro-electric dams, coal-fired power stations, and nuclear power plants. Ideas were being quickly materialized: plans were made, meetings were held, and Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs) were signed.

However, not all was smooth sailing. China would soon have to reconsider its plans in Pakistan following terrorist attacks either targeting CPEC workers or the proposed regions for CPEC projects.

Chinese suspicions were received with promises of commitment by the Sharif government to make the execution of the corridor smooth and safe. China decided to tread carefully—starting with smaller projects.

Although security concerns are an important factor explaining China’s interest in Pakistan, China has other reasons to strengthen its ties with Pakistan too. In the last two decades, China has increased its global presence. To this end, China is taking a more proactive role in creating diplomatic ties with other nations. Pakistan is among the few countries that China can call a friend (Shambaugh, 2013). The friendship is a welcome change for the Pakistani political elites and various institutions of the state that are experiencing increasingly deteriorating relationship with the US (Small, 2015). Public support for Pak–China relations in Pakistan is also striking (Chandra, 2016). According to the Pew Research Centre survey of public opinion about China in Pakistan, 84 per cent of the respondents held a positive view about China, compared to 16 per cent for the US. If the survey is a realistic representation of reality, then Pakistan might be the most pro-China country in the world (Chandra, 2016).

The impetus that China–Pakistan friendship quickly gained post-2010 cannot be sufficiently explained by the Chinese interests in Pakistan alone. Pakistan had strong motivations behind strengthening its ties with China too. Pakistani military and civilian government had recently lost its long-standing friend—the US—and was experiencing the economic and military vacuum left behind by the US withdrawal.

Since its foundation, Pakistan has been highly dependent on foreign aid. One of its biggest donors throughout the history of the nation has been the United States. The flow of aid started as a part of the economic reconstruction effort. The aid played a crucial role in the high growth rates achieved in the 1960s—it gave impetus to industrialization and helped combat food insecurity (Zaidi, 2004, p. 104). The inflow of foreign aid during this period also lent support to public investment in infrastructure (mostly in power and irrigation sectors), and social services (Khan and Ahmed, 2007, p. 220).

Later, the ideological alignment and military ties with the US during the Cold War accelerated the flow of aid and irreversibly tied the Pakistani military into the foreign aid and development nexus (Zaidi 2004, p. 104). The aid accelerated during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan when the US lent its financial and military support to Pakistan to fight the Afghan War (Cooley, 2001). Since, the funds and training were not to be provided directly through the Central Intelligence Agency, but through Pakistan and its army, the security establishment accumulated immense power during this period (Cooley, 2001). Although aid during this period assisted Pakistan in upgrading its defense forces and military technology, it did so at the cost of rising terrorism, sectarianism, refugee crisis, rising debt-servicing expenses, and falling GDP (Hilali, 2002).

US-Pakistan relations remained strained throughout the 1990s; however, the friendship attained a new meaning following United States’ War on Terror. Pakistan received aid packages to fight terrorism within and outside its borders (Qazi, 2012). The political and social impact of war on terror within Pakistan has been disastrous.

Furthermore, Pakistan’s security establishment that has consistently provided refuge to the Taliban due its strategic interests, refused to comply with the US demands (Qazi, 2012). Civilian government too has been put off by the increasingly chaotic nature of the aid. Disappointed by Pakistan’s performance in fighting terrorism, the US keeps announcing delays or cancellation of the promised aid (Naviwala, 2017). In consequence, Pakistan has experienced a gradual withdrawal of the US resulting from the doubts that the US policy makers have cast upon the Pakistan’s role in fighting terrorism and effectiveness of aid as a counter-terrorism policy (Zaidi, 2011).

To examine the benefits of CPEC, the existing research is diverse and revolves around two streams, micro-level targeting individuals’ benefits [7–9] and macro-level targeting the country level benefits [10–13]. At the micro-level, the relevant studies focused on the quality of life, job opportunities, poverty alleviation and living standards in general [8, 14, 15]. However, research on the importance of CPEC in rural areas of Pakistan is very rare. In particular, how these ini- tiatives would affect the life of common man and woman, and whether the effect was direct or indirect through some intermediaries still need to be examined. This study attempts to fill this gap by examining the direct role of CPEC in improving the lives of common people, particu- larly the women, as well as the indirect effects through rural development in the form of devel- opment of local infrastructure.

The novelty, as well as contributions of this study, are threefold. First, considering the exist- ing living standards and facilities available to rural women in Pakistan, which is attributed to the less or no access to the basic facilities like education, hospitals, parks, industry, which con- tributes to the low level of income [16], this study contributes in examining the potential bene- fits for these women in the rural areas.

Children’s trong upbringing, physical development and sound mental health. Unfortunately, in the context of Pakistan, which is considered as patriarchal and termed as a male dominant society particularly in the rural areas, women are largely restricted to the households. Women are largely neglected and are considered as middle and upper sections of the society, and

are subject to violence in the rural areas. Surprisingly, around 75% of women population of Pakistan live in tribal and rural areas [39]) and remained structurally disadvantaged and con- sidered a second class citizen in the context of rights and decision making. Women are victim- ized both socially and culturally due to discrimination in the rural areas due to the traditional norms, family rules and low status in the society [39]. Women are subject to have experienced violent behavior in terms of rape, burning, honor killing and acid throwing, in particular, women in rural areas of Pakistan face economic and social discrimination [40]). Every year, several cases of rape, honor killing and other domestic violence are reported in Pakistan, which was a clear indication of the failure of enforcement of the relevant laws. For example, the constitution of Pakistan and other different laws prohibit these activities against women but authorities often do not enforce properly. For example, the property laws in Pakistan empower the women to have their rights in the properties, however, some social pressures from the family members and the traditions discourage them to raise their voices for their rights ([41]). Women empowerment is the only solutions for these problems, however, to empower them it is important to educate them, which is only possible through the provision of education and other subsequent benefits which are related to their employment and auton- omy [42, 43]) highlighted the problems which the rural women face, for example, firstly, igno- rance regarding their rights and their basic rights which can give them ease from doing the hard tasks of fetching water from far areas, fetching woods for burning, secondly, looking after the livestock of the household, and finally, they are often deprived of their social and economic rights such as health and education facilities, family planning measures, decision making authority and ownership of land and livestock along with the rights of their sale and purchase.

According to the new Census of Pakistan (2018), a total of 63.33% of the population (64% women) live in rural areas in the four provinces namely; Sindh, Baluchistan, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Rural areas are those areas where the basic facilities such as hospitals, schools, industries and irrigation etc. are lacking, with relatively poor housing facilities. About 35% of Pakistani rural population live below the subsistence level where social services and basic facilities are absent. Women are more disadvantageous as compared to men in these rural areas, due to the cultural and traditional conventions. The most common problems faced by rural women are; low or no employment opportunities, high wage discrimination, lower access to socio-economic opportunities, lower access to health facilities, occupational segregation, and harassment in the workplace. Therefore, most of the people living in rural areas tend to migrate to urban cities to access the basic facilities and resulted in the population shift from rural to urban areas. For instance, Fig 4 shows the reduction in a rural population from 65.7% in 2008 to 63.3% in 2018.

To overcome the major issues in rural areas, the government has planned to encapsulate several programs in CPEC mega projects.

Several projects are initiated under the CPEC in the four provinces; Punjab, Sindh, Balochi- stan and KPK to benefit the urban and rural areas. We have discussed a few major projects that were intended to benefit rural areas of the four provinces.

3.1 Sahiwal 2x330MW coal-fired, power plant, Punjab

It is an energy project with 1,912.2$ million investment which would generate electricity with the coal energy and also includes building a railway track connecting the village of Yusuf Wala to the project site for the exclusive use of the power plant.

Following the US raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011, Pakistan faced intense international condemnation regarding its role in fighting extremism within its boundaries. During such times the country that openly voiced support for Pakistan was China (Pant, 2012). China expressed its interest in becoming an “all-weather strategic partner” of Pakistan (Pant, 2012). It was in this backdrop that the developmental vision of the Sharif government, the political and economic interests of the military establishment, and global, national and strategic interests of the Chinese government coincided.

CPEC is expected to encourage foreign investors and foreign direct investment in different industrial sectors of Pakistan. In this manner, the local communities in Pakistan would enjoy employment opportunities and business growth opportunities [12] and would result in not only in the development of the local infrastructure, but also the economic development of the country as a whole [66]. Naz, Ali [10] claimed that CPEC would boost industrial growth and would link business industries of Pakistan globally which would benefit households’ social wel- fare. These international linkages would result in more FDIs and high economic growth for both China and Pakistan [67]. The megaprojects would positively contribute to social welfare and sustainability by improving the infrastructure [68]. For instance, CPEC would configure the developmental projects (infrastructure, the tourist industry, housing, hospitals, schools, food, livestock, energy and social welfare) in Kashmir that is a moderately developed area of Pakistan and a central destination of tourists [69].

With the announcement of CPEC projects, local people and communities have observed and perceived a great improvement in health facilities, job opportunities and infrastructure [9]. In particular, CPEC routes connect rural and urban areas of Pakistan which would increase the access of the people from rural areas to the urban areas to access the basic health, education and social-economic facilities [70]. Similarly, tourists have perceived a very positive change in the infrastructure of tourists’ places in different areas of Pakistan because of the mega projects of the CPEC. Hence, by increasing the number of tourists, business growth and performance of the local communities would improve [19]. CPEC will promote not only the mutual trade relationship between China and Pakistan but also with other countries across the border.

Conclusion:

An analysis of the China’s foreign policy and national interests led to the conclusion that China has little interests or motivation to alter the power imbalances in Pakistan that are being exacerbated by CPEC. China is intent on preserving political stability in its bilateral relations. This inclination is reflected by a no strings-attached aid policy, reluctance to meddle in the internal issues, and respect for territorial sovereignty. The less apparent driver of China’s foreign policy is its national interests, which sometimes diverge from its principles of non-intervention. For example, China is bent upon preserving political stability and is completely intolerant to regionalist ambitions given the problem of regionalism within its borders. Given this concern, China is expected to not react well to the regional elites, making diverging claims to the central planning of CPEC.

Hence, I argue that, unless there is national or international backlash against the effects of CPEC on Pakistan’s political economic structure, CPEC can be expected to maintain the status quo of power structures of the Pakistani state—the fissures of which are going to only deepen further.