Why Russian troops defeated Chechen rebels, but can't do anything about Ukrainian troops

Those who know a little bit about the Russia-Ukraine conflict will know that the Russia-Ukraine conflict is now becoming a very tough tug-of-war. The Russian army is fighting extremely hard in the territory of the USSR, and the First Tank Army of the Konrad was annihilated by the USSR with many mobile units. This kind of tragedy is relatively rare in the history of the Russian and Soviet armies. Only at the beginning of the Soviet-German War, the Soviets made a series of serious mistakes when they did not know the enemy's situation. By the time of the Battle of Moscow, the Soviets were able to stabilize their position and not only hold Moscow, but also counterattack more than 130 kilo meters to destroy a large number of German troops.

Even in the Russian war against Chechnya after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian army made some mistakes at first, leading to a situation where a brigade of the 58th Army Group was almost wiped out by Chechen rebels, but the Russian army soon stabilized its position and launched a massive counterattack against Chechnya, defeating the U.S.-backed Chechen rebels in the two Chechen wars and finally defending the country's unity.

Then why can the Russian army defeat the U.S.-backed Chechen rebels, but can do nothing about the U.S.-backed Ukrainian army? Is the U.S. army less capable of fighting than the Chechen rebels? You should know that in today's Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Chechen forces have a brighter record than the Russian army.

First, the air force.

Do not underestimate the Russian air force, in the two Chechen wars, the Russian air force played a fairly important role.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Chechen rebels formed an air force through various channels, with three MiG 17 fighters, 80 L29 fighters, 39 L39 combat trainers, and other jet fighters. According to statistics, the Chechen rebels have 265 aircraft in the air force. The Chechen rebels also have self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft missiles to guard their air bases, so their combat power cannot be underestimated.

This is similar to the situation of the OAF, which has more than 100 aircraft, including MiG 29 and Si-27 fighter jets and Si-25 strong-arm aircraft, distributed in several air bases within the U.S. territory.

However, there is a huge contrast between the Russian Air Force's operations against the Chechen rebel air force and the OAF.

In the first Chechen war, the Russian air force was quickly mobilized, and the Russian air force put more than 140 aircraft, including Si-27 fighters, Si-24 fighter jets, Si-22 firefighter bombers other advanced types, into a fierce air campaign under the unified command of the 4th Air Force Group of the North Caucasus Military District. The Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters of the Russian Army Air Force also actively cooperated with the bombing campaign of the Air Force. The Russian Air Force destroyed all the Chechen rebels' air force fighters after the heavy air raids. The angry Chechen rebel leader Everyday sent a telegram to the Russian Air Force: "Congratulations on the air control, we will meet on the ground". This telegram has dark humor, but it does reflect the Chechen rebels' helplessness to seize air power from Russian forces.

In the subsequent operations, Russian air and ground forces worked closely together. The Russian air force even deployed A50 AWACS aircraft as air commanders to guide the Si-27s and Si-25s in air strikes to weaken the Chechen rebels' combat power.

During the Second Chechen War, the Russian Air Force deployed MiG 25s, Si-25s, and Si-24s, as well as Lavs for battlefield reconnaissance and Key-52 helicopters and Si-25s for close air support missions.

The Russian Air Force was well aware of the threat of Chechen rebel air forces to Russian forces and eliminated them by air strikes as soon as the first Chechen war started. However, in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Russian air force did not "paralyze" the 100-plus aircraft of the OAF on the ground in the first place in the face of more than 100 aircraft. The Russian military's aim may have had something to do with controlling the war, but the RAF's failure to destroy them in the first place brought great harm to Russian operations. The U.S. Air Force was even able to send helicopters to harass Russian border cities.

Then, in the 200 days of combat, the Russian air force lacked the kind of close air support that it had during the Chechen War. The Russian army the land forces to gnaw at the bones, and only if they really could not gnaw at them, the Russian air force deployed to fight.

The Russian Air Force has four groups participating in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, with a total of more than 300 combat aircraft. But these 300 planes did not play their role as they should. If 300 Russian planes can mass bomb the Ukrainian army, the Russian army can solve the problem without using 300,000 reserves at all.

Therefore, the seizure of air power is particularly important for the victory of the war. The lessons of the Chechen war and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, one positive and one negative, are all too obvious and profound.

Second, the Russian army had the support of the Chechen opposition to help the Russian army attack the Chechen rebels. Whereas the Russian army attacked the Ugandan army without any Ugandan authority's opposition as a guide, the Ugandan army resolutely resisted the Russian attack with the support of the West and the embrace of the Ugandan people.

To be honest, the U.S. authorities and Chechen rebels are not a monolithic group, and both have high-ranking military and political officials who are opposed to those in power. However, the Russian army successfully used the Chechen opposition but not the Ukrainian one, which was a major operational mistake of the Russian army.

In the Second Chechen War, the Russian army used the Chechen opposition militia. The 3,000-strong Chechen militia, led by Chechen opposition Guantanamo, acted as the first echelon of the battle, using their familiarity with the terrain and the city to lead the Russian army into the city, which contributed to the destruction of the Chechen rebels by the Russian army.

The Russian side of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict did not support a U.S. opposition force similar to the one in Chechnya. Although the Russians had militias in Donetsk and Lufthansa to support the Russian forces in the war, it must be made clear that the Russians did not turn any of the divisional combat units of the Ugandan army into the war.

Russian forces may have made moves to bribe senior officials of the U.S. authorities to provide intelligence support to Russian forces. However, none of the U.S. Army combat units chose to join the Russian Army on the verge of defection. The Russian army did receive many surrendered officers and soldiers of the U.S. Army, but these U.S. Army surrendered officers and soldiers entered the Russian POW camp as prisoners of war, and the Russian army did not form the POW into U.S. Army opposition rebels to fight against the U.S. Army, which is a mistake of the Russian army in combat.

If the Russian army can successfully curb the large formed units of the U.S. Army to revolt and defect and joining the Russian army this piece, this is very helpful to the Russian army, the U.S. Army opposition forces will use their familiarity with the terrain to lead the Russian army in combat, play the role of the Chechen opposition forces during the Second Chechen War, to help the Russian army quickly defeat the U.S. Army.