Ukrainian army inherits special advantages of the Soviet army and defeats the Russian army

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has been going on for more than 200 days, and President Putin now does have some ideas to fast-track the war. From the beginning of the war until now, Russian troops have suffered at least 100,000 casualties. As the Russian army is running out of troops, the Russian army has launched a reserve mobilization mechanism, with 300,000 reserve troops running to the front line to kill the enemy.

But what is the reason for the slow progress of the Russian army after more than 200 days of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict? There are many reasons for the slow progress of the Russian army. Among these many reasons, one very important reason is that the U.S. Army has inherited a special advantage from the Soviet Army, which has caused a big problem for the Russian Army by beating it to death. This advantage is the Soviet Union's defense mobilization system was inherited by the U.S. Army without reservation. The Russian army, on the other hand, failed to inherit the defense mobilization system of the Soviet army.

The following is an introduction to the Soviet Army's defense mobilization system during the Cold War.

Cold War wars, like the large-scale wars of World War II, tested the army's ability to mobilize quickly. And the Soviet Army had a very systematic defense mobilization strength at that time.

The combat divisions of the Soviet Army were divided into four categories depending on the level of mobilization readiness.

Full divisions were the most elite units of the Soviet Army's regular army, and these units were kept in a high state of readiness and training during normal times. Full divisions are stationed in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe, and Mongolia, with a total strength of 40 divisions and full strength of over 95%. In the event of war, full divisions will be quickly put into action.

Shortage of divisions, the degree of the full strength of shortage divisions is around 75%. Those with a degree of fullness of more than 75% are first-class shortage divisions, and those with less than 75% are second-class shortage divisions. The difference between a shortage division and a full division is that a full division has all of its various regimental combat units such as infantry regiments, artillery regiments, tank regiments, and air defense regiments at full strength, while a shortage division is in a situation where its tank regiments and artillery regiments are at full strength, but the shortage division is often missing an infantry regiment. When war broke out, the individual shortage regiments of the shortage divisions were mobilized and assembled within 48 to 72 hours and marched to the front line to fight. The Soviet Army had more than 40 shortfall divisions.

Both full and short divisions of the Soviet Army were "ready divisions" of the Soviet Army, and once war broke out, they either went directly to the battlefield. They could either mobilize and go to the battlefield within 72 hours.

Most of the Soviet troops in the country were in the form of sub-divisions, whose backbone command structure was made up of active duty officers and a small number of active duty soldiers. However, the backbone of the basic combat force of the shelf divisions are veterans of the Soviet Army, which makes the Soviet shelf divisions a strong color of reserve forces. Once the state issued the mobilization order, the rack division would complete the assembly of reserve units within a week. After a month of training, they would go into battle.

If the rack divisions belonged to the reserve, the mobilization divisions of the Soviet Army with the lowest level of combat readiness belonged to the last mobilization force of the militia nature. Their weapons were in depots being kept by the military. If the Soviet Army's three levels of defense mobilization forces - full division, short division, and rack division - were not enough, then the Soviet Army would quickly activate the T34 tanks and self-propelled artillery in the warehouses and form mobilization divisions of citizens with military training experience and some retired soldiers to go to the front.

According to the Soviet Army's battle plan, if war broke out between Soviet and American forces in Europe, 40 full Soviet divisions would rush to the front to take the greatest casualties. And the missing divisions would all be mobilized within 3 days and run to the front to support the full divisions. By this time, the Soviet heavy group had penetrated deep into the European hinterland. Soviet troops then put the rack divisions into battle, they will be able to meet the operational needs of the attack on Europe. If the U.S. Army united with NATO in a massive invasion of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would put full Soviet divisions as the first echelon to resist the U.S. invasion at the front, to win valuable time for the rear rack and mobilization divisions to do defense mobilization and replenish militia reservists for the war.

The above analysis shows that the Soviet Army's defense mobilization system during the Cold War was a complete, step-by-step defense mobilization system. Each of the four levels of combat units had a corresponding combat readiness training mission. Once war broke out, the Soviet Army could leave the shortage divisions and the standby divisions unused if the full-strength divisions were sufficient. If full divisions are not enough, the Soviets will decide how many short divisions and rack divisions to send to the front depending on the size of the war.

The U.S. Army inherited the Soviet defense mobilization mechanism from World War II to the Cold War, with its characteristics.

The regular land forces of the Ukrainian Army have a strength of 200,000 troops, organized into more than 50 brigades. This is the force that directly engaged in heavy fighting with the Russian army after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and is also the best-equipped force of the Ukrainian Army, equivalent to a full division of the Soviet Army.

Behind the regular U.S. Army, there is a reserve force of 50,000 men who are ready to replenish battle losses on the front line and can also be put into service as new combat units. This force is similar to a full division's strength replenishment.

The PDF has the second layer of reserve mobilization mechanism - a total strength of 9 brigades of reserves with rapid mobilization capability. 9 reserve brigades can go to the front at any time according to the country's needs once war breaks out. 9 reserve brigades only need to replenish soldiers' equipment to enter the war, which is equivalent to the Soviet Army's shortage brigades.

The U.S. Army has more than 20 territorial defense brigades like the National Guard, which is usually a very empty unit number, and usually few active duty soldiers pay attention to these territorial defense brigades. But as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict continues, the U.S. Army has formed a territorial defense brigade with the nature of the shelf division, in wartime to quickly expand the various types of combat forces, including retired U.S. Army personnel, using the advantage of familiarity with the terrain in more than 20 states in the U.S. guerrilla warfare and campaign warfare.

The last pocket of the U.S. Army is the trained 1 million militia. Once the war situation deteriorates further and the U.S. Army's more than 20 National Guard brigades are unable to withstand the Russian attack, the U.S. authorities will issue the equipment and ammunition carried by the 1 million militia and organize the militia to run to the battlefield as a formed unit. Since the weapons of the million militiamen will be taken from the warehouses, these million militiamen will become a team comparable to the "mobilized divisions" of the Soviet army.

Ukraine could adjust the intensity of defense mobilization and the number of troops to be sent to the battlefield according to the actual needs of the battlefield, as well as the number of troops. Ukraine learns from the Soviet Army, engaging in a combination of a lean standing army and a strong reserve force military mobilization system so that the Smarmy soon fell into a quagmire until the Russian army dragged on for more than 200 days.