The Fractured Alliance: Inside the Accusation Against Yemen's Separatist Chief

The recent Saudi airstrikes against forces loyal to Yemeni separatist leader Aidarus al-Zubaidi were more than a tactical military move. They were a public and stunning rupture in an alliance that has defined nearly a decade of war. The subsequent accusation of “treason” against al-Zubaidi from a Saudi-backed Yemeni official is not mere rhetoric. It is the breaking point of a fragile partnership, exposing a fundamental truth: the battle for South Yemen’s future is now as active and consequential as the war against the Houthis in the north. This internal collapse threatens to unravel the entire anti-Houthi front and makes a cohesive peace process impossible.

To understand this moment, one must understand Aidarus al-Zubaidi. He is the president of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a political and military force that seeks the restoration of South Yemen as an independent state. A former governor of the critical port city of Aden, al-Zubaidi commands significant loyalty in the south. His power stems from deep-seated grievances that date back to the 1990 unification with the north, which many southerners believe led to their political and economic marginalization. For his supporters, al-Zubaidi is not a traitor; he is the most viable champion for southern self-determination.

The alliance that just fractured was always a marriage of brutal convenience. Since 2015, a Saudi-led coalition has fought to restore Yemen’s internationally recognized government, which was ousted by the Iranian-backed Houthi movement. This coalition was a patchwork of incompatible interests. It included the official government, led by President Rashad al-Alimi from the northern city of Riyadh, and the STC, which dreams of secession. Saudi Arabia’s primary goal was defeating the Houthi threat on its southern border. The United Arab Emirates, the coalition’s other key member, had a different focus: securing the southern coastline and ports, and containing Islamist influence. To that end, the UAE became the STC’s chief patron, arming and training its forces.

The accusation of treason stems directly from al-Zubaidi’s actions on the ground. Reports indicate his forces moved to seize key military bases and, most critically, oil-producing infrastructure in Shabwa governorate. This was a direct challenge. Control of Shabwa’s oil revenue is a lifeline for the cash-strapped official Yemeni government based in Riyadh. By moving on these assets, al-Zubaidi was not just expanding his territorial control; he was threatening the financial viability of his nominal partner. From the Saudi and official government perspective, this was a hostile act that sabotaged the already shaky unity of their coalition during a sensitive period of indirect talks with the Houthis.

Saudi Arabia’s decision to use airstrikes signals a major strategic pivot. After years of a costly military stalemate, Riyadh is now deeply invested in finding an exit through negotiations with the Houthis. For these talks to have any chance, Saudi Arabia needs a stable and unified political entity on the anti-Houthi side with which to coordinate. A rogue, ambitious al-Zubaidi destabilizing the south makes him a liability. The strikes are a blunt instrument to compel compliance, a message that the STC’s ambitions must be subordinated to Riyadh’s broader diplomatic timeline and the fiction of Yemeni unity.

Complicating this picture is the enduring shadow of the United Arab Emirates. The UAE has not publicly condemned al-Zubaidi’s moves in Shabwa. This silence is telling. While publicly aligned with Saudi strategy, the UAE’s priorities in Yemen have consistently diverged. Abu Dhabi views the Islah party—a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate that is part of the official government—as a fundamental threat. The STC has been a useful counterweight to Islah’s influence. This creates a perilous two-level game for al-Zubaidi: under direct pressure from Saudi Arabia, but potentially still enjoying quiet support from his original benefactors in Abu Dhabi. This external division fuels the internal conflict.

On the ground in Aden and other southern areas, the “treason” label is viewed with cynical disdain. For many southerners, the real betrayal came from years of neglect and corruption by northern-dominated governments. The official government, operating from a hotel in Riyadh, has failed to provide basic services or security in the areas it claims to rule. The STC, in contrast, functions as a de facto government in Aden, filling a vacuum. Al-Zubaidi’s push into Shabwa is framed by his supporters not as treachery, but as a necessary consolidation of southern authority to build a capable state entity, one that can finally control its own resources and destiny.

The immediate implications for the wider war are severe. First, it diverts military resources and attention from the front lines with the Houthis, potentially creating openings for them. Second, it reveals a fatal weakness in the anti-Houthi coalition, undermining its leverage in any negotiation. The Houthis can rightly argue they are facing a fractured and squabbling opposition. Third, it risks igniting a new, fully-fledged conflict within the south itself, between STC forces and other Saudi-backed militias loyal to the official government, dragging the region into another cycle of violence.

The path forward is fraught. Saudi Arabia will likely intensify pressure on al-Zubaidi to return to the terms of the stalled Riyadh Agreement, a power-sharing deal that has never been fully implemented. This may involve offers of greater political inclusion or threats of further military and financial isolation. However, al-Zubaidi has proven to be a resilient political operator. His legitimacy is rooted in a popular southern cause, not just foreign backing. If he perceives that Saudi Arabia is irrevocably opposed to southern aspirations, he may decide his survival depends on defiance, betting that the strategic value of the southern coast will force Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to eventually deal with him on his terms.

The accusation against Aidarus al-Zubaidi is therefore a watershed. It marks the point where the latent conflict over South Yemen’s status has erupted into open confrontation between nominal allies. It proves that the war in Yemen is not one conflict but several: an international struggle against the Houthis, a regional competition between Saudi and Emirati visions, and a fundamental internal dispute over national identity and sovereignty. Until the question of the south is addressed politically—not as a peripheral issue but as a core grievance—no agreement with the Houthis will bring lasting peace. The strikes in Shabwa did not just hit military targets; they shattered the illusion of a unified front, revealing the deep and perhaps unbridgeable fissures that will define Yemen’s future long after the guns with the Houthis fall silent.