Iran: Coming Fall of the Regime

Iran: Coming Fall of the Regime

By Omid Habibinia

The Islamic Republic is entering what may be its final chapter. Following Israeli and American attacks, Iran’s rulers now face their weakest and most isolated moment in over four decades. Public discontent simmers just below the surface, and if it erupts—as it did during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement of 2022—the regime will struggle to suppress it.

Inflation has soared, unemployment grips millions, and a restless younger generation openly rejects state-imposed rules like mandatory hijab. Blackouts, water shortages, and a collapsing currency deepen everyday misery. Online repression grows harsher, but even the cyber-police cannot silence the rising tide of defiance. Inside the barracks, meanwhile, the once-feared security forces are demoralized and fractured.

Yet the regime’s greatest vulnerability lies in its looming succession crisis. Ali Khamenei’s sudden death—now a question of “when,” not “if”—would leave behind a vacuum no institution can fill. The Assembly of Experts, tasked with appointing the next Supreme Leader, is paralyzed, bound to Khamenei’s shadow and incapable of elevating a credible successor.

Names once floated as candidates have vanished. Ayatollah Shahrudi is dead; Ebrahim Raisi perished in a helicopter crash, despite being groomed for leadership. Others are too old, too weak, or too irrelevant to command authority across the regime’s three power pillars: the clergy, the Revolutionary Guards, and the bazaar. Mojtaba Khamenei, seen by some as heir-apparent, is rarely seen in public and lacks the charisma or clout his father wielded in 1989. For the first time in modern Shia history, Iran faces the prospect of having no religious authority capable of holding together a collapsing theocracy.

Meanwhile, the economy is in freefall. Inflation hovers near 65 percent, the rial plummets daily, and shortages of medicine and basic goods deepen despair. Despite billions in oil revenue, the regime spends its resources not on citizens but on repression, foreign adventures, and enriching a corrupt elite. Negative growth, shrinking reserves, and suffocating corruption have left Iran’s economy on life support.

The streets tell the rest of the story. Despite crackdowns, young Iranians persist in acts of civil disobedience: removing hijabs, flooding social media with dissent, confronting officials in viral videos. Surveys show more than 70 percent of Iranians no longer believe in the system’s legitimacy. Even in conservative strongholds, whispers of revolution are now spoken openly.

Iran’s prisons—not its exiled opposition—harbor the regime’s true nightmare: brave women, intellectuals, scientists, and artists who embody the spirit of “Woman, Life, Freedom.” Their voices, silenced behind bars, remain the pulse of a movement that nearly toppled the regime once—and could again.

Today, Khamenei hides from bunker to bunker, old, ailing, and increasingly irrelevant. His death, another foreign strike, or the eruption of a new uprising could push the regime past the point of no return. The Islamic Republic is no longer simply fragile—it is teetering on the edge of its imminent end.

Public Opinion and Polling

A newly circulated analysis of last year’s national polling indicated that roughly seven in ten Iranians do not want the Islamic Republic to continue. But that snapshot is already outdated. Given the latest economic, security, and governance shocks, the real level of opposition today—especially among younger Iranians—is likely higher. A sober reading of street sentiment and daily costs of living puts the figure above eighty-five percent. This is not a partisan claim; it is the logical consequence of collapsing purchasing power, diminishing services, and a state that treats its citizens as suspects rather than stakeholders.

New Wave of Protests and Crackdown

Power and water cuts have triggered fresh protests in Shiraz and other cities across the country. Crowds gathered near government offices and central squares, voicing demands as basic as reliable electricity and clean water. Security forces responded in familiar fashion: heavy presence, arrests by the dozens—if not hundreds—and a tighter choke on the Internet. Younger Iranians have become adept at routing around censorship, but throttling and platform blocks have grown more aggressive. The pattern is consistent with previous cycles: when essential services fail and prices climb, people take to the streets, and the state relies on force instead of fixes.

Economy, Currency, and Sanctions Risk

On Wednesday, the rial set a grim record—trading around 955,000 rials per U.S. dollar in the free market (the day after rised to 1.200 M Rls), compared with roughly 600,000 rials on the same day last year. By that measure, the national currency has surrendered about sixty-five percent of its value in a single year. Prices that were barely tolerable twelve months ago are now impossible for many households. At the same time, the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) have signaled readiness to trigger UN “snapback” sanctions, raising the prospect of deeper isolation and even tighter financial arteries.

The new government—elected in an environment where only about half of those eligible were permitted to vote—has been unable to deliver on its promises. Each week of drift feeds the belief that relief is not coming; each outage and price hike confirms it. Layer on the threat of another war, and you have a society living with rolling crisis and without a safety net.

About the Author:

Omid Habibinia is a senior investigative journalist and communications scholar with over three decades of experience in leading Persian and international media outlets, including BBC, France 24, and Iran International. He currently focuses on political communication, Iran, and Middle East affairs. He has studied, researched, and taught across various disciplines, including communications and global studies, and has presented numerous papers on Iran and media at international conferences such as the IAMCR and the Global Communication Association (GCA).