Ian Bremmer: U.S. Ending Its “Own Global Order”

Political scientist and Eurasia Group president Ian Bremmer has issued a stark warning: the United States is bringing an end to the global order it spent decades building. According to Bremmer, Washington’s shifting priorities, domestic polarization, and growing reluctance to underwrite international leadership are accelerating a transition toward a far more fragmented and unpredictable world.

For much of the post–World War II era, the United States sat at the center of a global system it designed and largely enforced. That system rested on open trade, multilateral institutions, security alliances, and the assumption that American power—economic, military, and ideological—would act as the ultimate stabilizing force. Bremmer argues that this era is now decisively ending, not because the U.S. has collapsed, but because it no longer wants the job.

At the heart of Bremmer’s analysis is the idea of “G-Zero,” a concept he has long championed. In a G-Zero world, no single country or alliance is willing or able to lead on global challenges. The U.S., once the default problem-solver, is increasingly inward-focused. China is powerful but cautious, unwilling to assume the costs of global leadership. Europe is divided, Russia disruptive, and emerging powers focused primarily on domestic development. The result, Bremmer says, is global drift.

Recent U.S. behavior supports this argument. Washington has grown more selective about its international commitments, questioning the value of long-standing alliances and multilateral agreements. From trade disputes to skepticism toward global institutions, American policy has increasingly reflected domestic political pressures rather than global stewardship. Even when administrations change, Bremmer notes, the underlying trend remains consistent: voters are less willing to pay the price of leadership abroad.

This shift does not mean the U.S. is withdrawing from the world entirely. Rather, it is redefining engagement in narrower, transactional terms. Instead of maintaining global order for its own sake, Washington is prioritizing short-term national interests. Bremmer argues that this approach erodes trust among allies, who can no longer assume consistent American backing in moments of crisis.

The consequences are already visible. Conflicts are harder to manage, global institutions struggle to enforce rules, and regional powers feel emboldened to test boundaries. From territorial disputes to economic coercion, the absence of a clear referee has increased volatility. Bremmer warns that while no single event may mark the end of the U.S.-led order, the cumulative effect is unmistakable.

China’s rise is often framed as the main driver of this transition, but Bremmer disagrees with simplistic narratives of power replacement. He emphasizes that Beijing does not seek to recreate an American-style global system. China benefits from selective engagement, bilateral leverage, and ambiguity. It wants influence without responsibility—an approach that works precisely because the U.S. is stepping back.

Europe, meanwhile, faces its own dilemma. Long dependent on American security guarantees, European nations are now grappling with the need for greater strategic autonomy. Bremmer suggests that while Europe has the economic weight to play a larger role, internal divisions and slow decision-making limit its effectiveness. Without a unified voice, Europe struggles to fill the leadership vacuum.

For developing nations, the end of the U.S.-led order brings both risk and opportunity. On one hand, weaker global rules expose them to pressure from stronger states. On the other, a multipolar environment allows for more diplomatic flexibility. Bremmer notes that many countries are now hedging—maintaining ties with multiple powers rather than aligning firmly with one.

Domestically, the U.S. debate over global leadership reflects deeper societal divisions. Questions about inequality, immigration, and national identity have reshaped how Americans view their role in the world. Bremmer argues that until the U.S. resolves its internal fractures, it will lack the political consensus needed to sustain international leadership, regardless of who occupies the White House.

Critics of Bremmer’s view contend that the U.S. is not ending its global order but adapting it. They argue that selective engagement is a rational response to overextension and that American power remains unmatched. Bremmer counters that power alone is insufficient. Leadership requires willingness, legitimacy, and predictability—qualities increasingly absent from U.S. policy.

The most troubling aspect of this transition, Bremmer warns, is not decline but disorder. A world without a stabilizing leader is not necessarily more democratic or balanced; it is often more dangerous. Global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and technological governance require coordination that a fragmented system struggles to deliver.

In Bremmer’s view, the U.S. ending its “own global order” is not an abstract theory—it is a lived reality unfolding in real time. Whether this shift leads to a more resilient multipolar system or a prolonged era of instability will depend on how nations adapt to leadership without a leader.

What is clear, Bremmer concludes, is that the world can no longer assume the United States will step in to manage crises or enforce rules. The global order the U.S. built is fading, and nothing equally coherent is ready to replace it.