Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal: Strategic Command, International Interests, and Covert Oversight

Pakistan stands among the few nations in the world possessing a substantial nuclear arsenal. These weapons are not just symbols of deterrence, but central to Pakistan’s national security strategy. The safety, deployment, and control of these nuclear assets are overseen by a specialized structure of political and military leadership known as the National Command Authority (NCA).

The NCA is Pakistan’s highest decision-making body concerning nuclear policy. It consists of senior political leaders, top-ranking military officials, and intelligence chiefs. Their role is to ensure that Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is secure, stable, and responsive in times of crisis.

Beneath the NCA functions the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which serves as the operational secretariat. The Director General of SPD holds direct control over the planning, coordination, and management of the country’s nuclear weapons. The SPD is responsible for strategic decision-making, logistics, and security protocols of nuclear installations.

To implement nuclear strategy across the armed forces, three distinct military commands operate under the SPD:

1. Army Strategic Forces Command (ASFC)

2. Navy Strategic Forces Command (NSFC)

3. Air Force Strategic Forces Command (AFSFC)

These commands together constitute Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) infrastructure. The NC2 system ensures tight control over all aspects of the nuclear arsenal—including storage, movement, maintenance, and potential deployment. It is designed to prevent unauthorized access or accidental launches and to maintain credible deterrence against perceived threats.

However, outside of Pakistan’s internal command structure, there exists a powerful external interest that closely monitors the country's nuclear capability. This is not a traditional state actor, nor part of Pakistan’s military or intelligence networks. It is, in fact, an elite arm of the United States military.

Enter the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—a covert division under the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). JSOC includes the world’s most elite Special Mission Units (SMUs), trained for high-stakes, classified operations across the globe.

Why would JSOC be interested in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons?

According to strategic analysts, the United States has long maintained contingency plans for extreme scenarios involving nuclear states. In the case of Pakistan, if the country were to face internal collapse, or shift drastically away from U.S. alignment—posing a threat of its nuclear arsenal falling into the wrong hands—the White House could authorize JSOC to conduct a rapid operation.

Such an operation could involve seizing or neutralizing nuclear warheads located in SPD-controlled facilities. To support this possibility, logistics systems and rapid deployment units from JSOC had previously been stationed in the region, particularly during the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. These units were believed to be on standby for emergency missions.

However, since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the operational status of these systems remains unknown. It is unclear whether the U.S. has established alternative bases or continues to maintain covert infrastructure in the region to monitor Pakistan's nuclear assets.

This intersection of nuclear strategy, regional instability, and international military oversight highlights the complex geopolitics surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear program. While the NCA and SPD remain the official custodians of Pakistan's strategic deterrent, the interest and potential intervention of foreign powers like the United States add another layer of global tension.

As geopolitical dynamics in South Asia evolve, especially in light of Pakistan’s domestic challenges and shifting foreign relations, the question of nuclear control and international surveillance becomes increasingly critical. It remains to be seen how future developments might shape the fate of one of the world’s most closely watched nuclear arsenals.