Italian Military: WWII

Italy's entry into World War II began with the invasion of Greece on October 28, 1940, known as the Greco-Italian War. Mussolini sought to expand Italy's influence in the Mediterranean and establish dominance in the Balkans. It was the first military campaign of Italy in World War II, but it did not have a favorable outcome for the new members of the Axis Powers. Moreover, it overextended Italy's military power and left their territories in Africa(Libya) extremely vulnerable, "The Italo-Greek conflict was of particular importance because it diverted Italian land, air, and sea forces at a time when they were desperately needed in North Africa to parry a British attack there." (Sadkovich Pg. 440) The invasion of Greece was a boom or bust type of offensive aimed at kickstarting Mussolini's conquest in World War II. Mussolini sought to expand Italy's influence in the Mediterranean and establish dominance in the Balkans. However, the campaign quickly turned into a quagmire for Italian forces. Italian troops suffered significant setbacks, facing unexpected heavy Greek resistance, leading to a stalemate by November 1940. Mussolini's ambitions suffered a blow as Greek forces pushed back Italian invaders in the mountains of Epirus and Albania. On November 14, 1940, Greek forces launched a counter-offensive, pushing the Italians deep into Albanian territory.

The Greek counter-offensive stalled past the Albanian border, which prompted German intervention in April 1941, shifting the balance in favor of the Axis powers. German troops invaded Greece, overcoming Greek resistance and occupying Athens on April 27, 1941. The need for German assistance was a huge blow to the Italian people's confidence in Mussolini, "Italo-Greek conflict also put Mussolini at odds with his armed forces, shattered the fragile unity of the fascist hierarchy, disillusioned the Italian public and alienated the Italians from their German allies." (Sadkovich Pg. 446). Adolf Hitler personally was outraged when he was forced to stall his invasion of the Soviet Union(Operation Barbarossa) to come to the aid of Italian troops. While Greece eventually fell to the Axis, the need for German assistance in the Greco-Italian War revealed critical weaknesses in the Italian military. It undermined Mussolini's ambitions for territorial expansion. The Italian Military would be further exploited during the fight for Axis expansion in Africa.

Before the Greco-Italian War, Italy's involvement in North Africa began in September 1940 with an offensive into Egypt aimed at seizing British-controlled territories and securing access to vital resources. General Rodolfo Graziani led Italian forces and initially made gains in Libya but faced stiff resistance from British and Commonwealth troops. While most of the Italian Military was campaigning in Greece, British forces launched Operation Compass on December 9, 1940, a counter-offensive that inflicted a series of defeats on the Italians. Tobruk fell to British troops on January 22, 1941, followed by the capture of Benghazi on February 6, 1941. I want to highlight the Siege of Tobruk, which lasted from April to December 1941 and was initially seen as a promising opportunity to secure a vital supply route in North Africa. However, Allied forces' stubborn defense of Tobruk, primarily Australians and British, prolonged the siege and highlighted logistical challenges and coordination issues within Axis forces. The failure to capture Tobruk by December 1941 was a significant setback, depriving the Axis of a strategic base and disrupting plans for further advances in the region.

The Italian Tenth Army suffered heavy losses and retreated into Libya. However, following these defeats(of the Italian Tenth Army) and the overall Axis victory in the Balkans, the Italians boosted their troops in Northern Africa. Italy turned its full attention to the conquest of Africa, and "for the period between March 1941 and May 1943, the Italians deployed an average of 150,000 men in North Africa (support and combat troops)." (Carrier Pg. 505) Along with the waves of fresh troops from Italy, General Erwin Rommel and his tank crews were deployed in early 1941 to rejuvenate Axis efforts in North Africa. However, the deployment of Rommel revealed Mussolini's lack of control over the situation, "The arrival of the German forces in February 1941 marked the end of the Italian guerra parallels, in the guerra subalterna, Italians lost control of 'their' war and Rommel became, de facto, the commander-in-chief of the Axis forces, at least until early 1943." (Carrier Pg. 506) Despite Italian and German cooperation, the campaign continued to be characterized by logistical challenges and supply shortages. Towards the end of the struggle for North Africa, the Battle of El Alamein, fought from July to November 1942, Axis forces, led by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, aimed to achieve a decisive victory to reverse the Allied momentum in North Africa. German/Italian forces made initial gains, but logistical problems and Allied air superiority hampered Axis operations. Despite hopes of breaking through the Allied defensive line, the Axis position weakened, and the battle culminated in a decisive Allied victory. The defeat at El Alamein marked the beginning of the end for Axis ambitions in North Africa. The true end was the resulting Tunisia Campaign(occurring in May 1943) that saw the Allied forces drive the Axis forces "out of Africa."

Despite setbacks in Greece and North Africa, Mussolini remained committed to supporting Nazi Germany's expansionist ambitions. In June 1941, Italy declared war on the Soviet Union and dispatched troops to the Eastern Front. Mussolini viewed the invasion as an opportunity to expand Italian influence in the Balkans and the Mediterranean while aligning with Hitler's grand vision of reshaping Europe. Italian military involvement in the Eastern Front was limited compared to their German counterparts. Italian forces primarily operated in secondary theaters, such as the Balkans and the Caucasus, where they faced harsh conditions and determined Soviet resistance. There was an Italian presence in Operation Barbarossa, "In July 1941, around 62,000 Italian troops of the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia, CSIR) left for the Eastern Front to aid in the German invasion of the Soviet Union" (Marino) The Italian military's performance in the Eastern Front was mixed. While some units demonstrated bravery and resilience, they were hampered by logistical challenges and the harsh winter conditions of the Eastern Front. However, in the early days of Barbarossa, "The Italian units became the spearhead of an entire group of German armies. The corps as a whole participated in the general advance to the Dneiper River, taking up positions between Oerizevka and Dneipropetrovsk by September 17." (Marino) Unfortunately, supporting the Germans on the Eastern Front proved to be a brutal and costly decision for Italy, with significant casualties and little strategic gain. Despite these challenges, Italian forces participated in several notable engagements during Operation Barbarossa. They fought alongside their German allies in battles such as the Siege of Sevastopol and the defense of the Mius River line. Mussolini's decision to align Italy with Nazi Germany in this theater of war further strained relations with the Allies and deepened the country's isolation on the world stage. The campaign in the East would ultimately prove to be a costly and unsuccessful endeavor for Italy, contributing to the erosion of its military resources and hastening its eventual defeat in World War II.

Citations:

Carrier, Richard. “Some Reflections on the Fighting Power of the Italian Army in North Africa, 1940–1943.” War in History, JSTOR, Nov. 2015, www.jstor.org/stable/26098450.

Marino, James I. “The Italian Army in Russia: From Barbarossa to Stalingrad.” Warfare History Network, 13 Oct. 2022, warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-italian-army-in-russia-from-barbarossa-to-stalingrad/.

Sadkovich, James J. “The Italo-Greek War in Context: Italian Priorities and Axis Diplomacy.” Journal of Contemporary History, JSTOR, July 1993, www.jstor.org/stable/260641.