Iran: Revolution, Rapid Growth and Turmoil

The Iranian revolution that began in January of 1978 caused religion to take a more prominent role in Iranian society. At the same time the revolution caused Iran to abolish any influences or standards that were adopted from the Western world. This was an act primarily implemented by Mohammad Reza Shah who was the leader of the Pahlavi Dynasty. The dynasty had been in place throughout the region since 1925 and was well established. Shah was later forced to leave Iran which made way for the new religious government.

The new government that was brought into place by the Khomeini’s caused more distance, harsher relationships and a negative view towards the West. These issues still rage on today in modern Iran. The cause of the Iranian revolution was a combination of corruption in the Pahlavi government and the dissatisfaction of the Iranian people with regards to Western ideology. The people felt they had lost their traditional culture and were being pressured by the Islamic State and Khomeini to return Iran to its roots.

Arguments can be made that the corrupt Shah and his regime slowly built-up pressure which was a main catalyst in causing the revolution. The forcing of American ideals by Shah’s regime caused an eminent backlash from the Iranian people and fueled the revolution once it started to propagate. These factors combined with the Iranian people holding the view that religion should be the main force in government were not only what triggered the revolution but what saw it through to completion.

The corruption of the Pahlavi Dynasty and Shah was based around their use of propaganda that made it appear they were economically assisting Iran. A closer analysis of the details however shows that it was quite the opposite (Cooper). The boom in the Iranian economy that was evident at the time was not caused by the Pahlavi Dynasty or the Shah, it was in fact the discovery of mass amounts of oil that triggered the economic boost which began in the mid 1950’s (Browne). By 1973 the profits made through transactions related to the oil had reached five billion dollars and there was no evidence of any future decline. By 1978 profits had escalated dramatically, topping 54 billion dollars and the results from the economic boom were felt across Iran.

The economic boom from oil had affected almost all ways of life in Iran. The largest sectors to feel the effects were industry and education. Between 1953 and 1977 education in Iran was expanded ten-fold. Industrialization in Iran also increased at a rate equal to that of education causing more opportunities and economic growth (Cooper). From this rapid change in industrialization there were two social classes to emerge. A middle-class and an urban middle-class.

The middle class was made up of people who had decent jobs and brought in a good salary. This social class consisted of skilled workers that were employed as engineers, teachers and other skilled trades (Browne). There was only approximately 324 thousand people in this class and it represented a marginal 5.4 percent of Iran’s labor force (Cooper). As the economic boom continued to grow so did these emerging classes but not at a rate even close to that of profits being made or rate of industrialization in Iran (Cooper). By 1977 it is estimated that only 6.7% or 630 thousand people were considered middle-class.

The urban middle-class primarily worked in industries such as oil and mining. The increase in industrialization also drove an increase in the number of people considered to be in this social class level. Initially the urban middle-class represented approximately five percent of Iran’s labor force but by 1977 that number had more than tripled to an estimated 16% (Cooper). The urban middle class who had emerged with approximately 300 thousand people in the mid 1950’s had grown to 1.7 million in about twenty years (Cooper). This number has continued to grow and the urban middle-class is now estimated to make up 25 percent of Iran’s labor force.

This emergence of a new middle-class tiers combined with the rapid growth of industrialization also spurred an increase in the demand for higher education. Many Iranians began to peruse university degrees to match growing demands both in industry and in complimentary fields. This in turn drove the educational system to rapidly grow (Buchan). As the people became more educated literacy rates increased and social issues such as infant mortality rates declined (Buchan). The unfortunate reality of this however is there was a severe lack of social equality.

As Iran made great strides in moving forward and went through many important stages of growth, most of the positive effects were felt by only a small portion of Iranian society. The increases in wealth and education were greatly lacking in equity (Browne). A large reason for this was due to the corruption caused by trickery in the government who used the perspective of positive growth in a way to lead the people to believe that Iran was heading in the right direction. While Iran’s illiteracy rates decreased from 74 to 56 percent and the infant mortality rate dropped from 20 to 12 percent it was only temporary (Buchan). After 14 years of the white revolution these numbers steadily increased (Buchan). The number of illiterate Iranians climbed from 13 million to 15 million people (Cooper). Although there had been an increase in revenue and Iran had received a boost from oil, the regime had continually failed in providing a better quality of life.

At the time it may not have been apparent, analyzing the statistics in Iran give great detail on how the quality of life was substandard compared to other countries in the region or with the same level of industrialization. For example, the doctor to patient ration was significantly lower in Iran than in other countries (Buchan). Consumer goods and commodities such as air conditioning, refrigerators, other household appliances and personal automobiles had become increasingly common but the percentage of households that were living in a single room had increased from 36 to 42 percent (Browne). Additionally, the Shah had failed to implement proper infrastructure for necessary services that the people required such as sewage or transportation systems.

The appearances of modern amenities and outlooks to an optimistic future simply were not enough to solve the issues being faced by the Iranian people. It was said that the Shah was slow when it came to understanding that the Iranian people’s spiritual malaise could not be remedied with the use of charts, performing studies, issuing projections or forecasting economic outcomes (Browne, p.117). For all the propaganda that Shah had used to try to sway the Iranian people, to prove the money from the oil was used well, the actual problems in Iran were proof that this was not the case. The younger generations of Iran realized that the leadership was corrupt and no longer believed what they were being told or shown. The belief at the time was “the Persians can stand a great deal of misgovernment, but even they could no longer support the tyranny and mismanagement of this Minister.” (Browne, p.120) This refers to how Shah had completely mismanaged the oil revenue for Iran and then attempted to hide his misdoings using propaganda. In looking at the facts it is clear that the government attempted to trick the people of Iran into believing they had wealth which ended up being a main reason for the people to drive them out.

There is a strong connection between the mismanaging of revenue from Iranian oil and the want to force Western and American ideal onto the Iranian people. The Pahlavi’s and the general population felt as though having these ideals forced was causing them to lose their culture (Browne). A large portion of this sentiment had to do with Bazaars and their huge importance in Iranian culture and the effect that came from Shah disconnecting himself and the regime from the middle class in Iran (Browne). The middle class contained approximately 250 thousand store owners who had shops in large Bazaars across the country (Browne). These Bazaars could range in size and some could span for up to three square miles (Buchan). The Bazaars in Iran were key both to the economy and also as a valuable cultural asset (Cooper). The owners of the shops in Bazaars had always been well off and lived moderately well because of the power they had over multiple stores and over their store assistants (Buchan). The influence the Bazaars had extended outside of their local areas and reached factories and farms as they worked with each other to supply goods around the country.

Because of their relationships, Bazaars were responsible in keeping many people in rural areas employed at smaller manufacturing plants around the country. Many of the 430 thousand small manufacturing plants in Iran were located in small towns and focused primarily of carpet and furniture production (Cooper). Each small factory employed on average about ten people and in most circumstances the laborers were women (Cooper). These small factories were reliant on the shop owners in the Bazaars to help sell their products and keep their local economy from collapse.

Overall, the Bazaars were highly important in social, political and economical aspects of Iranian culture. Without them, Iran would not have been able to function as a country (Cooper). The destruction of the Bazaars by Shah and his regime had devastating effects on the country with an impact felt by consumers, manufacturers and the shop keepers alike (Browne). From 1953 to 1975 the regime was cautious not to disrupt or disturb the Bazaars from a fear of awaking the “monster” (Browne). No direct efforts were made to destroy the Bazaars but there was a pull in the direction of international entrepreneurs and corporations (Cooper). This pull caused direct harm to the small shop owners who operated in Bazaars and gained opposition over time.

Religion was another aim of the Shah’s plan to Westernize the culture in Iran. Although Shah and his regime was cautious not to alienate the entire religious establishment, he did over time manage to replace many aspects of the laws and beliefs with a more progressive, Western system. Anyone who openly criticized these acts was exiled or imprisoned (Cooper). The most notable figure of the time who faced punishment for being outspoken was Ayatollah Khomeini (Buchan). The regime continued to make changes in Iranian culture and ignored the silent opposition (Cooper). In time however the precautions of not directly attacking the entire religious establishment faded and the silent opposition began to be targeted (Cooper). In 1975 plans to be reserved were abandoned by Shah and a “Resurgence Party” was formed (Cooper). This led to a system governed by a totalitarian regime and monarchy, anyone who disagreed was forced to leave the country.

Within a few months of the formation of the Resurgence Party they had complete control of the Bazaars. By taking control of the Bazaars the party was able to break many traditions and increase the foothold corporations and wealthy entrepreneurs had in the country (Browne). A chamber of guilds was established in many large towns and were owned by entrepreneurs (Browne). This allowed the state to use its power in Bazaars and caused a huge cultural shock and loss across the country (Browne). This is when talks of demolishing Bazaars to build up new infrastructure such as roads began. Replacing the Bazaars were government owned and state run markets. These markets came with new requirements most shop owners struggled to meet (Browne). They were required to have health insurance; a minimum wage was put into place and interest payments were required from small businesses (Browne). The regime used propaganda to blame Bazaars for everything that had gone wrong in the country and used that as reason for removing them (Cooper). For example, from 1975 to 1977 Bazaars were singled out as the cause for the high inflation rates in Iran (Cooper). This act allowed the Shah to undermine the Bazaars and remove this important part of Iranian culture.

These acts were all part of the Shah’s White Revolution which was unsuccessful and eventually led to his exile. By forcing Western ideals on the Iranian people and allowing such a high level of corruption in his government it was easy for Khomeini to promise to bring back Iranian culture and cause a revolt. Because the people were so disappointed with the loss of their culture, they were willing to invoke and extreme change and return Iran back to its cultural and religious state. This caused the downfall of the Shah and his regime as the people would no longer tolerate having their rich heritage decimated and changed into one similar to the Western world while having their country stripped of its resources.

Works Cited

Browne, Edward, et al. The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. 2nd ed., Mage Publishers, 2006.

Buchan, James. Days of God: The Revolution in Iran and Its Consequences. First American Edition, e-book, Simon and Schuster, 2013.

Cooper, Andrew Scott. The Fall of Heaven: The Pahlavis and the Final Days of Imperial Iran. 0 ed., e-book, Henry Holt and Co., 2016.

Cover Image

Gholami, Kamran. “Photo of a City at Night · Free Stock Photo.” Pexels, 11 Sept. 2020, www.pexels.com/photo/photo-of-a-city-at-night-3799176.