Anton Zelinskyi on OASK “Ghost-Court” Salaries, Judicial Corruption, and Wartime Reform in Ukraine

Anton Zelinskyi is a Ukrainian legal-reform advocate and Advocacy Manager at the DEJURE Foundation, working on judicial transparency, integrity vetting, and anti-corruption accountability. He is a member of the Public Integrity Council, which assesses judicial candidates and judges undergoing qualification review. In January 2026 he co-authored a Ukrainska Pravda investigation showing that, despite the 2022 liquidation of Kyiv’s District Administrative Court (OASK), the state spent about UAH 157 million over three years on judges’ remuneration while key cases stalled. He tracks how procedural sabotage, disciplinary bottlenecks, and Supreme Court rulings can revive discredited judges—especially during wartime—so reform can endure long-term.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen interviews Anton Zelinskyi, Advocacy Manager at the DEJURE Foundation and a member of Ukraine’s Public Integrity Council, about the scandal of “ghost-court” salaries after the 2022 liquidation of OASK. Zelinskyi explains that roughly UAH 157 million still went to judges because formal dismissal procedures stalled, allowing compromised figures to keep judicial status and pay. He argues disciplinary and qualification mechanisms matter because criminal cases can be delayed into uselessness through procedural sabotage. The conversation frames OASK as a corruption symbol whose legacy still threatens wartime judicial reform, accountability, and long-term institutional resilience in Ukraine at the highest levels.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Your January 2026 investigation cites ~UAH 157 million paid to OASK judges over three years. Why did this happen?

Anton Zelinskyi: Despite the official liquidation of the District Administrative Court of Kyiv (DACK or OASK in Ukrainian) in December 2022, approximately 157 million UAH has been paid from the state budget to its judges over the last three years. This occurred because more than 40 OASK judges still retain their judicial status and continue to receive substantial judicial remuneration. Even though the court was a "symbol of corruption" that blocked judicial reforms and even prepared a scenario for Yanukovych's return during the full-scale invasion, the judges remain on the payroll because the administrative process for their removal has not been completed.

Jacobsen: What were the primary data sources for this investigation?

Zelinskyi: The primary data source for the financial figures was an official written response from the liquidation commission of the OASK. This means the amounts we cite are not estimates or reconstructions, but exact figures recorded in the commission’s official accounting and reporting. In other words, we can trace and substantiate the calculation down to each hryvnia based on the commission’s documented data (including line items and totals), rather than relying on assumptions, media reporting, or secondary datasets.

Jacobsen: Why is this investigation significant?

Zelinskyi: The significance lies in the staggering opportunity cost of these payments during a time of war. The 157 million UAH spent on "judicial inactivity" is equivalent to the cost of tens of thousands of strike FPV drones or thousands of interceptor drones that could be protecting Ukrainian cities. Furthermore, the investigation reveals a systemic failure: the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) have been unable or unwilling to finalize the dismissal of these judges, allowing them to keep their privileges and potentially escape into "honorary resignation" with lifetime monthly payments at the taxpayers' expense.

Jacobsen: What legal/administrative mechanism kept the money flowing after OASK was liquidated?

Zelinskyi: Under Ukrainian law, the liquidation of a court does not automatically terminate a judge's employment or salary. A judge can only be dismissed by the High Council of Justice (HCJ) following specific procedures: qualification assessment or disciplinary proceedings. Until the HCJ makes a final decision, these judges are legally entitled to their remuneration. Many OASK judges have successfully exploited this by "falling sick" to avoid exams or relying on the HCJ's lack of a quorum to stall disciplinary actions.

Jacobsen: Why are disciplinary and qualification routes faster than criminal trials?

Zelinskyi: These administrative routes are more efficient because they operate under a lower standard of proof than criminal law. Crucially, the decision to dismiss a judge through these channels does not depend on a final guilty verdict in a criminal court. This allows the judicial system to purge itself of unfit members based on integrity concerns even while a criminal trial is still ongoing.

Jacobsen: In the HACCU case (No. 991/2030/22), what delay tactics have been effective for the defense?

Zelinskyi: The defense, led by figures like Pavlo Vovk and Yevhenii Ablov, has employed several creative and systemic tactics:

• The Braille Requirement: They involved a lawyer with a visual impairment and demanded that all 220 volumes of the case be translated into Braille.

• "Procedural Football": They continuously appeal every procedural decision, shifting the burden between the HACCU Appeals Chamber and the Supreme Court to stall progress.

• Absurd Excuses: Hearings have been postponed for reasons as trivial as a defense attorney taking their children to a water park.

• Systemic Absence: Frequent non-appearances, constant changes of lawyers, and a "mountain" of recusal motions against judges.

Jacobsen: In case No. 757/21651/24-к, how would limitation periods wipe out accountability?

Zelinskyi: This case, involving the blocking of the HQCJ's work, spent years being shuffled between judges in the Pecherkyi District Court due to constant self-recusals. By the time it reached the Podilskyi Court for trial in late 2025, the statutes of limitation had almost expired. This reveals a critical flaw in the Ukrainian criminal-procedure design: defendants can use procedural maneuvers to delay a trial until it is legally impossible for the court to impose punishment, effectively granting them impunity through exhaustion.

Jacobsen: Is the ghost-court era ending, and what indicates this trend?

Zelinskyi: The ghost-court era is not clearly ending. Right now, it looks more like stagnation and a real risk of rollback than a clean finish.

The biggest danger sits in the Supreme Court, because it can set a precedent that changes the rules for everyone. The key issue is wiretap evidence (NSRD). If the Supreme Court says this evidence cannot be used in disciplinary cases, the effect would be huge.

It would not be only about Vovk. It would also affect other former OASK judges and about 50 judges who were recorded taking bribes. Many of them were dismissed through disciplinary proceedings before any final criminal verdicts existed. If wiretap materials are excluded, this would effectively mean invalidating those dismissals, with a real chance that judges return to the bench.

That is why real progress requires renewal at the top, including the Supreme Court: integrity checks and selection of new judges with meaningful participation of independent experts nominated by international partners. This approach is explicitly prescribed in the EU’s Chapter 23 benchmarks for Ukraine.

Where international experts had a decisive role in selecting judges for a newly created anti-corruption court, it showed great results and delivered one of the most credible judicial selection outcomes.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time again, Anton.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a blogger on Vocal with over 120 posts on the platform. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978–1–0692343; 978–1–0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369–6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018–7399; Online: ISSN, 2163–3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719–6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The Good Men Project, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bankat In-Sight Publishing. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic fellowships, and currently serves on several boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20–0708028), and others.