Where Did Prashant Kishor’s Jan Suraaj Falter? A Mix of Overconfidence and Structural Weaknesses

The Jan Suraaj party, created by strategist turned political reformer Prashant Kishor, entered the Bihar assembly elections with strong online enthusiasm and significant media attention. However, this visibility did not translate into electoral gains. The party’s first performance illustrates how difficult it is to build a political organisation in a state that has long-established political structures.

A Reality Check in Numbers

Jan Suraaj contested 238 seats and did not win any, receiving around 3.5 percent of the total vote. This outcome largely matched early predictions, including those from Votevibe, which anticipated minimal seat success because of the party’s weak grassroots machinery. The party secured nearly 16.77 lakh votes, which comes to about 7,000 votes per seat. In earlier 2024 by-polls it had managed close to 10 percent of the vote, but in the assembly elections it crossed that mark in only eight constituencies and reached 5 to 10 percent in 31 seats.

A notable point is that NOTA outperformed Jan Suraaj in roughly 60 seats, and independent candidates collectively received a higher share in many areas. Out of the 238 seats it contested, candidates lost their deposits in 236, a sign that the party struggled to build even a basic voter base. It finished second only once and placed third in about 115 constituencies. Meanwhile, smaller but established parties such as AIMIM and BSP held onto their 2020 results, leaving little space for Jan Suraaj to break through.

Scattered Pockets of Strength and the Spoiler Effect

Even though the broader outcome was poor, the party did show small clusters of support. It crossed the 5 percent threshold in 39 seats and collected more than 10,000 votes in 35 constituencies. Only one candidate, from Marhaura, received over 30,000 votes. This happened partly because the NDA candidate in that seat was disqualified. In fact, two of the party’s strongest-performing seats benefited from either NDA or Mahagathbandhan candidates not being allowed to contest.

One of the most interesting aspects of the result was Jan Suraaj’s role in tight contests. In 34 constituencies, the party received more votes than the margin of victory, which suggests it may have influenced outcomes despite not winning. These candidates belonged to a wide range of communities, including MY (Muslim Yadav), upper castes, Mallahs, Ravidas, Dusadh, Pasi, Kurmi and Kushwaha groups. This reflected an attempt to present broad social representation.

How It Affected the Major Alliances

Among the seats where Jan Suraaj polled more votes than the victory margin, the NDA won 19, the Mahagathbandhan won 13, and AIMIM and BSP secured one each. In seven such seats, Jan Suraaj fielded candidates from the same caste groups as both major alliances, directly competing for identical vote segments.

Electoral patterns suggest that in 20 of these seats the party pulled more votes from the NDA, unintentionally helping the Mahagathbandhan win eight of them and reducing the NDA’s margin in the remaining ones. In 10 seats, the party seems to have cut into the Mahagathbandhan’s support, which helped the NDA in seven constituencies and reduced the opposition alliance’s margin in three. In four seats, Jan Suraaj appears to have drawn support from both sides, with Mahagathbandhan winning two, and BSP and AIMIM taking one each.

Why Jan Suraaj Failed to Gain Ground

Several reasons lie behind the party’s underwhelming performance. The most significant was the absence of a strong organisation. Established political parties in India rely on decades of booth-level networks, local workers and district units. Jan Suraaj lacked this basic infrastructure.

Timing also worked against the party. Building a viable political option in a state like Bihar requires more than three years. Comparisons with the Aam Aadmi Party are misleading, because AAP grew out of a large anti-corruption movement and years of street-level activism. Jan Suraaj attempted to compress a similar journey into a short period and relied heavily on professionals instead of committed cadres.

Prashant Kishor’s decision not to contest himself created a perception problem. Many voters interpreted this as a lack of confidence in his own political project. His long padyatra did generate publicity, but it did not create the grassroots machinery necessary to mobilise voters.

The party’s communication strategy also struggled. The slogan “arsh pe ya farsh pe” lacked clarity and emotional appeal. Continuous allegations that Jan Suraaj was acting as a secondary team for the BJP damaged its image among anti-BJP voters.

Ticket distribution further exposed structural weaknesses. An ADR report indicated that 43 Jan Suraaj candidates had criminal cases, which contradicted the party’s promise of clean politics. The absence of a formal manifesto, despite the presence of a professional planning team, raised questions about seriousness and policy preparedness. Kishor’s interview style, often perceived as overconfident, alienated potential supporters.

The party also misread the meaning of online popularity. High social media engagement did not translate into actual votes. Jan Suraaj was heavily identified with one individual, with no other recognisable leaders. Kishor’s Brahmin background may also have limited his appeal among Muslim and Yadav voters in a highly caste-sensitive environment. Allegations of ticket sales and internal rebellion in a few seats further weakened the party.

With both the NDA and Mahagathbandhan increasing their vote shares compared with 2020, Jan Suraaj gained votes mostly from smaller parties and independents. It did not significantly attract young Mahagathbandhan voters or upper caste NDA supporters. Welfare promises such as the offer of ten thousand rupees financial assistance for women appear to have neutralised whatever traction Jan Suraaj had gained among poorer voters who were responsive to issues like education and health.

Looking Ahead, Challenges and Opportunities

Despite a disappointing debut, Jan Suraaj is not without future potential. Bihar does have space for a third political force. The JD U faces uncertainty in the eventual post Nitish Kumar period, whenever that occurs, and the RJD is contending with internal disputes that could weaken Tejashwi Yadav’s position.

Jan Suraaj succeeded in bringing certain issues to the forefront and demonstrated that a section of voters is open to new political voices. If Kishor and his team analyse their mistakes, build a stronger ground organisation, stay engaged beyond election cycles and cultivate leadership beyond one figure, they may carve out a place in Bihar politics eventually.

The 2025 election might represent a rough beginning rather than the end of the Jan Suraaj experiment. Whether it becomes a short-lived episode or the starting point of a more durable political force will depend entirely on how the party responds to this moment of reckoning. And yes, letting go of the perception of arrogance will be essential.