It’s the End of the World as We Know It.

On August 6th, 1945, the face of warfare was forever changed with a single strike, as the first ever atomic bomb was detonated over the Japanese city of Hiroshima, resulting in nearly 135,000 casualties (Avalon). Days later, after the Japanese’s refusal to surrender, the United States dropped yet another, this time over the municipality known as Nagasaki, resulting in over 60,000 total deaths and injuries (Avalon). Nuclear weapons have seemingly failed to corroborate rationale, corroding common sense and promoting international instability. Though nuclear disarmament is an unlikely scenario in the modern era, nuclear abatement is a plausible alternative that may be the solution necessitated by global insecurity.

While the only two historical accounts of nuclear warfare are set in World War II, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have framed and fueled much of the normative ethics that surround politics and, more specifically, foreign policy. Others, however, assert that such theoretical justifications lack empirical accuracy and that, many times, contradict historical norms. To fully comprehend the enormity of the debate over nuclear weapons, one must explore their various forms and their destructive nature, understand the theories that encompass their utility as foreign policy tools and the history which supports or disproves these theories.

There are two fundamental categories of nuclear weapons: the atomic bomb (fission) and the thermonuclear bomb (fusion). Grace Young, a content analyst at Encyclopӕdia Britannica, explains how the atomic bomb operates in terms of nuclear fission: “When a neutron strikes the nucleus of an atom of the isotopes uranium 235 or plutonium 239, it causes that nucleus to split into two fragments…which then emit more neutrons that split still more nuclei. This series of rapidly multiplying fissions culminates in a chain reaction…generating the explosion” (Young). The atomic bomb was the model utilized by the United States in the bombings of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, resulting in large quantities of long term diseases and abnormalities, injuries, and death. The second type of nuclear weapon is a thermonuclear one, colloquially referenced as the hydrogen bomb. Chelsey Parrott-Sheffer, research editor at Encyclopӕdia Britannica, explicates the thermonuclear bomb as a “weapon whose enormous explosive power results from an uncontrolled, self-sustaining chain reaction in which isotopes of hydrogen combine under extremely high temperatures…in a process known as nuclear fusion” (Pattott-Sheffer). While thermonuclear bombs have never been used in times of war, historical documentation of the devastating effects in Hiroshima and Nagasaki render the impact of atomic bombs far from immeasurable. These bombs had two noticeable effects: the immediate blast effect and the longterm effect of radiation.

Since their introduction at the conclusion of World War II, nuclear weapons have spread across countries and have become a coercive foreign policy tool for many of these nations. Aside from the United States and Russia – the international community is overwhelmingly aware of the presence of nuclear weapons in these nations, as is evidence by testing and high nuclear tensions during the Cold War, culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis – there are numerous nations which are said to possess nuclear weapons. These countries “include Great Britain, France, China, India, and Pakistan. In addition, both Israel and North Korea are believed to have developed nuclear weapons and…Iran [is] believed to be actively pursuing them” (“Nuclear Weapons”). While the United States is well-known for having the largest nuclear arsenal of any country, many criticize its role in American foreign policy. For instance, Benjamin Friedman, research fellow in defense and homeland security at the CATO Institute, argues that “Nuclear weapons are essentially irrelevant in actual U.S. wars, which are against insurgents and weak states without nuclear arsenals” (Friedman).

“The fear of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a rogue nation led to war in 2003…the invasion of Iraq shows the strength of fear of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists” (“Nuclear Weapons”). Now given that nuclear power has no substantial coercive effect on other nations’ actions, perhaps one should shift the focus onto its rhetoric rather than application. DeGroot heavily scrutinizes nuclear discourse, contending that “we are held captive by a paralyzing obsession when it comes to all things nuclear. That obsession corrodes common sense, causing us to lose our sense of proportion” (DeGroot). He further contrasts the nuclear attacks during World War II with other Japanese disasters to convey the essence of proportion: “the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was no worse than the firebombing of Tokyo…In other words, nuclear weapons are not uniquely terrible” (DeGroot). Thus, there seems to be no outstanding reason as to why nations must cower in terror at the rhetoric of nuclear weaponry, as those who hoard them in bulk are too fearful to use them and their usage entails no uniquely horrible impact. Needless to say, their presence in foreign policy persists. DeGroot quotes Mueller, contending “nuclear weapons [are] a massive misjudgment inspired by irrational fear. Worst-case scenario fantasists have exercised an iron grip on international sensibilities…forcing nations to spend money on weapons that they did not need” (DeGroot). There is no apparent omnipotent value attached to nuclear weaponry, but rather an array of myths that have polluted nations’ common sense and proportion that seems more dangerous than cautionary.

Despite their overwhelming futility in foreign policy, a nuclear arms race remains atop the international regulatory agenda. International compacts have been created in attempts to prevent the prospects of nuclear proliferation: “The enormously destructive power of nuclear weapons has prompted many nations to make attempts to control both their spread and their use. A chief approach has been international arms-control treaties on the testing, numbers, and proliferation of nuclear development” (“Nuclear Weapons”). One of these such compacts is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: “The 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was created and signed by sixty-two nations in 1968” (“Nuclear Weapons”). However, despite this attempt to prevent nuclear proliferation, many countries have abstained from the agreement; they include India, Israel, Pakistan, and, most recently withdrawing from the accord, North Korea. These holdouts are problematic for the efficacy of these international treaties, as those countries that pose threats to international peace and stability are, coincidentally, those that have rejected these restraints.

Given that international constructs are proving to be insufficient to retard rogue nations’ nuclear development, what can be done to rectify the situation and demonstrate solvency to the present issue? While counterintuitive in nature, DeGroot offers a plausible conclusion: that the international community allow states such as Iran and North Korea to develop nuclear capabilities. He explains that “the value of these weapons for Ahmadinejad and Kim lies not in their potential for devastation but in the abhorrence they inspire in the rest of the world. Once the weapons cease to sow fear, they lose their value as a tool of political extortion” (DeGroot). In essence, these states are analogous to children who desire attention and nuclear constraints appease their demands for this attention. Rather than focus on prohibiting their nuclear development, perhaps the international community should seriously reconsider condoning it.

Many nations use their cumulative nuclear arsenal as a means of coercion, inspiring fear through desperate rhetoric, while simultaneously refusing to fulfill the extent of their threats. The United States has expended more monetary resources on a substantial nuclear arsenal than any other program, save for Social Security. Yet, its nuclear weapons remain idle, failing to halt the progress of rogue nations like Iran and North Korea. Rather than prioritize international treaties that constrain actions concerning nuclear development, perhaps the international community should pursue policies that discourage and eliminate the source of nuclear value for dwarf powers. Nuclear weapons have seemingly failed to corroborate rationale, corroding common sense and promoting international instability. Though nuclear disarmament is an unlikely scenario in the modern era, nuclear abatement is a plausible alternative that may be the solution necessitated by global insecurity.