Balancing the Majority: Reconsidering Countermajoritarianism in Contemporary Democracy

This article explores the ideas established in the abstract, finding a need for a nuanced approach to countermajoritarianism and making the case for a minimalist yet effective method of limiting majority power in contemporary democratic governments.

The Function of Countermajoritarianism in Liberal Democracy

Majoritarianism is different from liberal democracy. It combines democratic rule with liberal protections. These protections include constitutional provisions, checks and balances, judicial review, federalism, and the protection of minority rights. These institutions are established to avert the tyranny of the majority—where the majority might ride roughshod over the rights of minorities or individuals. Countermajoritarian institutions have played a key role historically in the democratization process. In highly polarized or previously authoritarian societies, minority elites were prone to demand institutional guarantees that their interests would be protected in exchange for accepting democratization. The institutions helped to stabilize young democracies by reducing feelings of domination. Yet as the abstract argues, precisely the same mechanisms that previously propelled democratization can now stand in its way. In consolidated democracies, excessively constraining checks on majorities can now fail to protect marginalized groups but instead protect the power of privileged elites. This inversion generates what political scientists call "democratic backsliding" or "undemocratic liberalism," where democratic legitimacy is eroded by disproportionate influence wielded by unaccountable or unelected institutions.

The Issue of Overgeneralization

One of the central issues raised in the abstract is the tendency to view all countermajoritarian institutions as always pro-democracy. This kind of thinking can lead people to become too complacent. For instance, institutions like lifetime judges, strong constitutional courts, or electoral systems that give strong weight to rural populations or wealthy segments can be claimed to be methods of protecting democracy, but they change the degree to which people are represented and responsible.

Consider the United States Senate or the Electoral College. These institutions were originally designed to balance power among states and prevent cities from dominating. Nowadays, they tend to provide greater power to sparsely populated rural states, enabling minority opinions to exert greater influence on legislation. Similarly, when judiciaries in democratic nations overstep their bounds, they can strike down legislation that is favored by many, contrary to the desires of the majority of voters.

When old countermajoritarian institutions are used to block progress, they make the political system less responsive and can increase public frustration and political division.

A Framework for Minimalist Countermajoritarianism

The abstract suggests a resolution to this uncertainty: a model of strong but minimalist countermajoritarianism. It recognizes the necessity of limits on majority power but demands they be rigorously justified, narrowly tailored, and relentlessly tested for their democratic worth.

This model stresses these major principles:

Functional Restraint: Restrictions must be placed to protect basic rights and democratic institutions, not to benefit political parties or powerful groups.

Proportionality: The degree of control should be proportionate to the risk it is intended to mitigate. For instance, temporary guarantees for minority ethnic groups might be required in post-conflict states, while it is harder to justify elite groups possessing permanent vetoes in the context of consolidated democracies.

Accountability: Countermajoritarian institutions like central banks or courts need to have explicit mandates, transparency, and accountability mechanisms to prevent the misuse of power.

Flexibility: Democratic institutions need to be flexible. Regulations that were functional in the past may become troublesome as societies change. Democracies need to be capable of reforming or removing non-democratic components without compromising their foundational liberal principles.

Empowerment of Inclusive Majorities: A good democracy ought to empower large and inclusive constituencies to govern effectively. The goal must not be to thwart majority rule but to make it work within a system of responsibility, equity, and rights.

Conclusion: Helping Democracies Solve Today's Problems

As the abstract accurately suggests, the healthiest modern democracies are those that empower, rather than disable, majorities. Empowered majorities of a heterogeneous electorate can enact reforms, address collective problems, and respond to demands. Where majorities are frustrated by relic countermajoritarian institutions, democracy becomes gridlocked, elitist, or vulnerable to populist backlash.

To uphold liberal values and democracy, societies have to design their institutions meticulously. Not all actions against the majority are democratic. Some are even antidemocratic. The challenge is to separate the means that further democracy from the means that undermine it. In short, 21st-century democracy must be revised. We need to embrace an effective but straightforward method of counteracting majority rule—one that protects essential rights and fairness while allowing inclusive majorities to govern. Only then will democracy genuinely speak for the people while honoring each person's dignity.