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Why TTP Attacks Are Rising in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Taliban’s Return, Political Discord, and Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Struggle

Taliban attacks on Pakistani state.

By Real contentPublished 4 months ago 6 min read
  • Earlier this month, following the viral footage of a militant attack on a military center in Bannu district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—showing Major Adnan Aslam of the Pakistan Army risking his life to save a wounded comrade—tributes poured in for his bravery from both public and official quarters. At the same time, many also voiced concerns over the growing wave of militant activities in the province.

    Looking at the recent news from different regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, it appears that banned Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has been carrying out frequent attacks on Pakistan’s security forces, leaving soldiers, policemen, and law enforcement personnel dead.

    Field Marshal Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif visited Bannu last Saturday, where the Prime Minister urged the Taliban authorities in Afghanistan to “choose between Pakistan or TTP.” Pakistan has repeatedly claimed that the banned TTP receives support from across the border in Afghanistan, though Afghan authorities deny these allegations.

    Counterterrorism experts note that ever since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021, there has been a dramatic increase in TTP’s operations and influence in Pakistan—a fact reflected in official statistics.

    According to government data, more than 2,500 people were killed in TTP attacks in Pakistan in 2024. The number of attacks that year was 66% higher compared to 2023. Similarly, according to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Counter Terrorism Department, in the first eight months of this year alone (2025), the province has witnessed 766 incidents of militancy, killing 366 security personnel and 92 policemen.

    The districts worst affected include Bannu, North Waziristan, Khyber, and Bajaur. However, the Inspector General of Police for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa believes that although TTP attacks have increased, the resultant casualties are fewer compared to last year—suggesting that law enforcement agencies are dealing more effectively with the militants.

    Most of these attacks have been claimed by TTP, which according to a 2024 United Nations report, is the largest terrorist organization operating in Afghanistan, enjoying support from the Taliban government to launch cross-border attacks into Pakistan. The report further states that the number of TTP fighters in Afghanistan ranges between 6,000 and 6,500.

    Why are TTP’s attacks and influence growing?

    Experts say the core reason is the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, which not only emboldened TTP but also provided it access to new resources.

    They argue that under the leadership of Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, TTP has become far more cohesive and focused than before.

    Former KP IG Akhtar Ali Shah explains that whether religious extremist groups or nationalist outfits, they all exploit the governance vacuum created by weak economic, social, and judicial structures.

    “Because of various factors, these groups even enjoy a degree of societal acceptance. Their recruitment continues, they keep receiving funds, they have propaganda machinery, and they maintain logistics… in a sense, just like other state institutions continue their functions, they too are carrying out their own parallel operations.”

    After former TTP leader Mullah Fazlullah was killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2018, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud was appointed as the new head of the organization.

    Experts say Noor Wali reshaped TTP’s strategy by reintegrating splinter militant groups that had broken away in the past.

    Security analyst Abdul Sayed notes, “From 2018, Pakistani Taliban began revising their policies to overcome the decline caused by past infighting and policies. After the 2020 Doha peace agreement between the Taliban and the U.S., these reforms became operational.”

    As a result, nearly 80 small and large militant groups—including major Taliban factions—rejoined TTP, fueling a surge in attacks. The group also adopted an Afghan Taliban-style centralized command system, better organizing its war against the state. For example, at the start of 2025, TTP announced a shadow structure of about 1,200 officials, establishing networks at the district and tehsil level in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as in parts of Balochistan, Punjab, and Sindh.

    Over time, TTP’s ideology has also evolved—from a narrow focus on enforcing Sharia through jihad to a broader narrative that now also advocates for Pashtun and Baloch rights, to project a more “popular” image.

    Counterterrorism expert Khurram Iqbal says, “Had the U.S. and international forces withdrawn from Afghanistan more responsibly, perhaps we wouldn’t have seen this resurgence of terrorism in Pakistan. The withdrawal was extremely irresponsible—large quantities of weapons flooded the black market, and TTP acquired advanced weaponry through this, intensifying their attacks.”

    He adds that while Pakistan’s military operations since 2014 achieved significant tactical success, the state failed to follow through with serious post-conflict reconstruction. “The federal government promised 100 billion rupees for the ex-FATA region, but not even a fraction of that has been invested in its development.”

    This lack of seriousness, he argues, has undermined the military gains.

    Khurram Iqbal also highlights the political discord between the federal government and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial government in recent years as another factor undermining counterterrorism efforts.

    He points out that over the past four years, TTP’s capabilities have increased significantly: their weapons are more advanced, their attacks more organized—all evidence of their growing operational strength.

    So, does this mean Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy has failed? Khurram Iqbal says: “If you look at the data, there is little doubt. Pakistan is now the world’s second most terrorism-affected country, after Burkina Faso.”

    Abdul Sayed adds that Pakistan’s internal political turmoil since the 2022 change of government prevented both political and military leadership from making unified, decisive moves against TTP. “In 2022 and 2023, political instability forced the government to prioritize survival over counterterrorism. This gave TTP the space to consolidate both politically and militarily.”

    Where does TTP get its funding?

    Experts say TTP’s financial structure is systematic and hierarchical. A central finance committee supervises regional sub-committees. These regional bodies prepare daily financial reports, which are compiled into monthly audits and shared with the central committee—in other words, a complex financial operation.

    Journalist Iftikhar Firdous, who reports on militant groups, recalls that in 2018, TTP issued a document titled “Laiha Amal” (Plan of Action).

    “This document laid out a comprehensive financial model for TTP—still in use today. At its core is ‘taxation’: extorting money from areas under their control and from individuals engaged in cross-border trade. They refer to this extortion as tax.”

    He adds that TTP propaganda channels also share digital currency account numbers, enabling sympathizers to donate.

    Indeed, TTP has long collected donations via cryptocurrency.

    Militant groups widely use cryptocurrency for fundraising because it allows them to collect money quickly while remaining hidden from security forces—at least until a specific crypto wallet is flagged.

    Operation

    Experts note that TTP’s media wing, Umar Media, has expanded significantly in recent years to glorify militancy and spread anti-state sentiments. In January 2025, TTP revamped Umar Media, announcing a detailed organizational structure, involving nearly three dozen members.

    Umar Media now operates through a wide portfolio: video and audio series, regular statements, and magazines in Urdu and Pashto. It has five specialized departments for audio, video, magazines, FM radio, and social media, along with a central media commission. The group also uses platforms like Telegram and WhatsApp to disseminate content.

    Iftikhar Firdous notes that TTP propaganda is no longer limited to traditional platforms like CDs, which were once common among such groups.

    “Now they’re on almost every social media platform. Their content heavily focuses on discrediting security forces, targeting Pakistani youth. Their website servers are spread across different countries, allowing them to operate even if one server is taken down.”

    However, he clarifies that TTP’s actual operations are still far smaller than their propaganda presence. Over time, the group has mastered the art of propaganda.

    to the Past

    Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Inspector General of Police, Zulfiqar Hameed, says that while militant attacks on police and security forces have risen in the first eight months of this year, casualties are 20% lower compared to the same period last year. He credits increased vigilance and proactive countermeasures.

    He claims that most areas of the province are now safer, though some districts still face challenges. He expressed optimism that conditions will improve soon even in those troubled areas.

    According to him, the situation has “significantly improved” in the past eight months: “There are no major problems now. Highways are safe. While attacks on police were frequent at the start of the year, our operations have reduced them, and the situation is now much better.”

    He added that wherever a threat arises, additional forces are deployed, and targeted operations are launched—leading to the killing of key militant commanders in areas like Lakki Marwat.

    Would you like me to also summarize this translation into a short analytical article in English (around 800–1000 words) for publication, instead of the full-length detailed translation?

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