Norway introduces DNS blocking of illegal websites

Norway’s parliament (The Storting) has decided to greenlight DNS blocking of a broad subsection of websites. The order will be carried out by the executive branch, which has published more details on its official website.

Specifically, the law targets any site that appears to offer, solicit or otherwise market “illegal” gambling services to its citizens online. The law went into effect on January 1st 2024, empowering the country’s gambling authority to compel ISPs to block “unwanted” domains.

The wording of the bill is opaque (likely on purpose). E.g, it states that any website “appealing” to Norwegians, but not limited to, using Norwegian wording to promote gambling services, may be blocked.

Interestingly, it does not specify whether it applies to stand-alone gambling operators, marketers or any site discussing gambling, in general. The vagueness of the bill's language makes it difficult to analyse.

It’s an interesting twist in an otherwise fierce battle between the government and foreign companies vying for a share of Norway's lucrative market.

An unsettling trend

To be fair, Norway is not alone. Their new restrictions follow a spate of similar censorship-initiatives in Europe.

In France, a new law dubbed "CREN" has already made its way through the upper house. It allows the French government to force DNS blocking of sites it deem to be non-compliant of the new law.

In Spain, websites belonging to the Catalonian independence movement were all DNS blocked, back in 2017.

Denmark has censored a wide-swath of content since at least 2011, including file sharing, mp3 converters and illegal gambling sites.

As reported back in 2021, The EU itself is actively developing its own DNS, with the project named "DNS4EU". Its goal is to wrest control away from US based companies, and to gain greater control over access to online content.

The list goes on.

What DNS blocking actually means

DNS (abbreviated from domain name system) plays a central role in how we navigate the internet. An often used analogy is that of a phone catalogue, matching numbers with an corresponding address.

In this case it helps establish a “link” between the domain name and IP-address.

Computers can’t read web-addresses the same way we do. In order to read domains, they rely on set of “layered” interpreters called DNS servers.

DNS blocking messes with the core structure of the internet, by setting up targeted roadblocks. After all, the website is there, but the ISP is refusing to honor a valid request through its DNS. It does so by serving a fake address in the “phone catalogue”.

When an address gets typed in, the browser's client requests the corresponding IP from the internet service provider's DNS. If the site is on the banned-list, the ISP will no longer be able to honor that request.

Instead, the request gets pushed over to a "fake" landing page, usually accompanied by a warning.

Designed back in the 1980s, DNS was intially based on principles of trust and transparency. Of course, anyone familiar with modern day DNS spoofing knows that didn’t work out as planned.

A sense of urgency

To see liberal democracies “spoof” DNS adresses brings an extra sense of urgency to the debate.

In the case of Norway, it should be noted that it’s not the first time it has blocked web pages. The first DNS blockade was introduced in 2015, as a means to combat file sharing of copyrighted material.

It was the first time Norway had censored any websites for unwanted content, and saw the likes of PirateBay and Primewire being rendered inaccessible overnight.

Now, an important caveat: The 2015 ban didn’t stem from the government itself. It was a court-ordered mandate, imposed after several lawsuits from media groups.

That's important, because it represents the first law that blocks certain forms of speech online, imposed by the government itself.

DNS blocking doesn't work

My issue with DNS-restrictions is two-fold.

To begin with, DNS blocking is extremely inefficient, and I was surprised to learn the Norwegian government had admitted that fact in its own conference hearing (where bills get discussed, before they’re voted on).

To use their own words, it can be “easily circumvented, either by utilizing a VPN or by changing the DNS addresses on the user’s network”.

Within these words lies the crux of this issue. In order to block websites through DNS, the government must compell an ISP to “spoof” (i.e, return a false result page to the end user).

This works in theory, because most online users wind up utilizing the default DNS belonging to the ISP. But as many are aware, it can be circumvented in a few seconds by tweaking the network settings.

I expect that plenty of Norwegians will follow that route, as the censorship-law goes into effect.

My second objection has to do with security implications. Changing the DNS can be risky, as it allows for cache-injections.

Unfortunately, the web is flooded with fake DNS offers, seeking to exploit users, usually at the cache level. I’m not sure most users understand the inherent risks that come with using a “free uncensored DNS”, found on some random online discussion board.

Attackers can easily clone websites, inject the DNS-cache and redirect users to a fake page versions, if they utilize these offers. In other words: It’s a mecca for online fraudsters.

Adding fuel to fire is the ease of which DNS blocks can be circumvented, using VPNs or proxies.